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Abstract 
 
The main thesis of this paper is that the ultimate cause of the current global 
financial crisis is to be found in the deeply flawed institutions and practices of what is 
often referred to as the New Financial Architecture (NFA) – a globally integrated system 
of giant bank conglomerates and the so-called ‘shadow banking system’ of investment 
banks, hedge funds and bank-created Special Investment Vehicles. The institutions are 
either lightly and badly regulated or not regulated at all, an arrangement defended by and 
celebrated in the dominant financial economics theoretical paradigm – the theory of 
efficient capital markets. The NFA has generated a series of ever-bigger financial crises 
that have been met by larger and larger government bailouts. After a brief review of the 
historical evolution of the NFA, the paper analyses its structural flaws. The problems 
discussed in order are: 1) the theoretical foundation of the NFA – the theory of efficient 
capital markets – is very weak and the celebratory narrative of the NFA accepted by 
regulators is seriously misleading; 2) widespread perverse incentives embedded in the 
NFA generated excessive risk-taking throughout financial markets; 3) mortgage-backed 
securities central to the boom were so complex and nontransparent that they could not 
possibly be priced correctly; their prices were bound to collapse once the excessive 
optimism of the boom faded; 4) contrary to the narrative, excessive risk built up in giant 
banks during the boom; and 5) the NFA generated high leverage and high systemic risk, 
with channels of contagion that transmitted problems in the US subprime mortgage 
market around the world. Understanding the profound problems of the NFA is a 
necessary step toward the creation of a new and improved set of financial institutions and 
practices likely to achieve core policy objectives such as faster real sector growth with 
lower inequality. 
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I.  Introduction 
The outline of the origin and trajectory of the current financial crisis, clearly the 
worst financial meltdown since the Great Depression, are well known. A housing market 
bubble began in the late 1990s and accelerated in the early-mid 2000s. Banks and 
mortgage brokers pushed mortgage sales because they earned fees in proportion to the 
volume of mortgages they wrote. Banks earned large fees securitizing mortgages, selling 
them to capital markets in the form of mortgage backed securities (MBSs) and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and servicing them after they were sold. Since, it 
was generally believed that banks distributed most of these mortgages to capital markets 
as asset-backed securities, it was expected that little if any bank risk was involved in the 
process. Institutional investors such as hedge funds and insurance companies demanded 
these complex, risky products because they were given high – often AAA – ratings by 
credit ratings agencies, yet they had higher returns than equivalently rated corporate 
bonds whose yield was constrained by the low interest rates of the era.1 Demand for high 
yield products based on mortgages was so great and bank fees so large that banks and 
brokers began to sell mortgages to those who could not afford them under terms that were 
bound to trigger large defaults when the housing price bubble evaporated and/or interest 
rates rose. The whole process was driven by accelerating leverage. 
Home sales peaked in late 2005 and home construction spending and housing 
prices topped out in early 2006. When the subprime mortgage crisis erupted in mid 2007, 
the entire edifice began to collapse. The crisis began in the US, but since mortgage-based 
financial products had been dispersed around the world, we soon had a global financial 
crisis.2  
The main thesis of this paper is that while the subprime mortgage market 
triggered the crisis, its deep cause is to be found in the flawed institutions and practices of 
what is often referred to as the New Financial Architecture (NFA). The term NFA refers 
to the integration of modern day financial firms and markets with its associated regime of 
light government regulation. In the next section, we argue that the ‘perfect calm’ from 
                                                 
1 Different returns on products with identical risk ratings should have signaled that something was seriously 
wrong with the way markets priced risk. 
2 See Baker 2008, Dymski 2007 and Wray 2007 for details of this process.  
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2003 to mid 2007 – low interest rates, loan default rates, risk spreads and security price 
volatility, along with high profits and rising stock prices - combined with the structures 
and practices of the NFA to encourage the excesses that caused the current crisis.3 They 
stimulated aggressive risk taking (not perceived as risky), pushed some security prices to 
unsustainable levels, dramatically raised systemic leverage and thus, to use Minsky’s 
phrase, financial fragility (the vulnerability of the financial system to problems that 
appear anywhere within it), and facilitated the creation of unprecedented financial market 
complexity and opaqueness. They also led to a secular rise in the size of financial markets 
relative to the rest of the economy, and created the preconditions for a global financial 
crisis. Regulators responsible for overseeing financial markets not only failed to prevent 
the excesses of the boom, but, with some notable exceptions, they assured investors that 
that the high yields and low risk spreads of the period were permanent, and thus that risk 
of crisis was minimal.  
After a brief review of the historical evolution of the NFA, the paper discusses a 
series of serious structural flaws therein. The list of flaws in the NFA is not exhaustive, 
and many of the problems are interrelated. They were chosen to facilitate the presentation 
of central structural problems that collectively led to the crisis. Each section reveals the 
inability of the NFA’s regulatory regime and the individuals who managed it to restrain 
the risk-seeking behavior of financial institutions. The problems discussed in order are: 1) 
the theoretical foundation of the NFA – the theory of efficient capital markets – is very 
weak and the celebratory narrative based on this foundation is, therefore, seriously 
misleading; 2) widespread perverse incentives embedded in the NFA generated excessive 
risk-taking throughout financial markets; 3) complex MBSs and derivative products 
central to the boom were ticking time bombs4: they could not be priced correctly and 
suffered from illiquidity problems that accelerated the downturn; 4) claims by the 
narrative notwithstanding, excessive risk built up in giant banks over the period; and 5) 
the NFA generated high systemic risk. Understanding the profound problems of the NFA 
                                                 
3 A risk manager at a large global bank described this perfect calm as follows. “We were paid to think 
about the downsides but it was hard to see where the problems would come from. Four years of falling 
credit spreads, low interest rates, virtually no defaults in our loan portfolio and historically low volatility 
levels: it was the most benign risk environment we had seen in twenty years” (The Economist, 
“Confessions of a risk manager,” August 9, 2008). 
4 Satyajit Das, author of numerous texts on financial engineering, explained that: “MBS structures reached 
levels of complexity second only to derivatives. … Few investors understood them” (2006. p. 283).  
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is a necessary step toward the creation of a new and improved set of financial institutions 
and practices likely to achieve core economic policy objectives such as faster real sector 
growth with lower inequality. 
 
II. The Evolution of the New Financial Architecture 
 
A series of financial crises in the US culminating in the financial collapse of the 
early 1930s convinced almost everyone that reliance on a lightly regulated ‘free market’ 
financial system was a reckless policy that threatened to undermine economic and 
political stability. The lesson drawn from these experiences was that the US should 
tightly and permanently monitor and regulate important financial institutions to prevent 
future system-threatening booms and busts. The regulatory regime put in place in the 
aftermath of the Great Depression was designed to accomplish these objectives and 
thereby prevent repetition of the speculative excesses of the late 1920s that led to the 
failure of thousands of banks in the early 1930s and helped cause the Great Depression. 
The main task for regulators was to prevent excessive risk-taking by core financial 
institutions and, in so doing, make serious financial crises less likely. 
Under the so-called Glass-Steagall regulatory system put in place in the mid 
1930s, investment and commercial banking activities were separated.5 The segregation of 
commercial banking and capital markets was intended to prevent the use of bank deposits 
to finance speculative capital market activity, a practice that helped bring on the crisis of 
the early 1930s. Regulators closely monitored and tightly controlled commercial bank 
activity. The new FDIC insured bank depositors against risk of loss, a move that virtually 
eliminated bank runs for four decades. The new SEC regulated investment banks, though 
with a very light touch, primarily by forcing them to provide more complete and 
dependable information about securities to the public. Residential mortgage loans were 
guaranteed by the Federal Home Loan Bank, which helped accelerate residential 
construction and made mortgages safe for lenders.  
In the Glass-Steagall system commercial banks originated and retained consumer 
and commercial loans, and thus were motivated to avoid excessively risky loans, and 
                                                 
5 See Russell 2008 for a more detailed analysis of regulatory change in this era. 
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provided liquidity to other financial institutions in times of market stress. Their ability to 
provide adequate liquidity was protected by tight government restrictions on the risk they 
could take. Banks thus could serve as lender of next-to-last resort to other financial 
institutions, while the Fed and FDIC were there to be lender of last resort to banks in case 
of a serious crisis. This system worked well from World War II until the 1970s, 
facilitating the rapid real sector growth with declining inequality that led this period to be 
called the ‘Golden Age’ of modern capitalism. In particular, tight regulation dramatically 
reduced bank failures and eliminated systemic financial crises.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, two developments undercut the efficacy of the Glass-
Steagall system.6 First, US financial markets were buffeted by rising inflation and the 
Third World debt and Savings and Loan crises. These events created great strains in the 
system. Second, financial institutions were increasingly successful in evading regulatory 
constraints, in large part because political commitment to a strong regulatory system had 
weakened over the decades. This dialectic of financial regulation is an inherent problem 
in modern state-guided capitalisms. Catastrophic economic and political events often lead 
to successful attempts to tightly regulate the industries believed by the public to be 
responsible for their problems. But as time passes, regulated firms have a strong incentive 
to try to weaken and evade their regulatory restraints. In financial markets, innovation is a 
major weapon in this game. The US and other advanced capitalist countries were thus 
confronted with a choice. They could either substantially reform their regulatory systems 
so financial markets would continue to be restrained from excessive risk taking under the 
new economic conditions, or they could return to the pre-1930s free-market ideology and 
undertake radical deregulation. Since there was no strong progressive political movement 
to defend effective financial regulation, free market ideology won the day. Rejection of 
strong financial regulation was a hallmark of both the Thatcher and Reagan ‘revolutions’ 
in the UK and US, and it soon spread around the globe.  
The elimination of the 1930s legislation that segregated commercial banking and 
the capital markets in 1999 was the culmination of two decades of radical deregulation 
that created what is often called the ‘New Financial Architecture’ (NFA). The NFA 
                                                 
6 A more complete analysis of the process of deregulation would have to incorporate many additional 
contributing factors and would reach back to the mid-1960s.   
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replaced the tightly regulated commercial-bank based financial system of the Golden Age 
with the lightly regulated capital-market based, globally-integrated financial system we 
have today.  
The NFA is founded on the core belief embodied in modern mainstream financial 
economics that unregulated capital markets are “efficient” in that security prices always 
correctly reflect their true risk-return dimensions. The canonical neoclassical models of 
financial markets, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Options Pricing 
Theory embody a joint hypothesis: 1) they assume that all agents know all information 
relevant to the pricing of securities – they have ‘rational’ or correct expectations of the 
future cash flows that will emanate from all securities; and 2) they assume that 
competitive markets generate ‘optimal’ equilibrium security prices created by decisions 
that maximize agent preference functions. The most important deduction from modern 
financial markets theory is that markets always price risk correctly as long as 
governments do not distort financial decision making through regulation. This is the main 
theoretical foundation that supports the NFA: if agents know the correct price of risk, 
they cannot be induced to hold more (or less) risk than is optimal for them. Given this 
conclusion, there is little need for government intervention. Reflecting its foundation, the 
NFA embodies light regulation of commercial banks, minimal regulation of investment 
banks, and the virtual non-regulation of increasingly powerful nonbank financial 
institutions such as hedge and private equity funds and bank-created special investment 
vehicles (SIVs) discussed below – the so-called “shadow banking system.” The NFA’s 
faith in the efficiency and safety of free financial markets thus represents the total 
rejection of the conventional wisdom that evolved from the series of financial crises that 
culminated in the financial collapse of early 1930s – that a country must either tightly 
control its financial markets or suffer from volatile boom-bust financial cycles, excessive 
growth of financial markets, systemic crises, and, ultimately, massive financial bailouts. 
Since this conventional wisdom is supported by realistic theories of financial markets, 
countries reject it at their own peril.    
In brief, supporters of the NFA believe it has the following strong points. In the 
Golden Age, banks made the lion’s share of household and commercial loans and kept 
them on their balance sheets. In the NFA, it is argued, banks still originate loans, but the 
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marvels of modern financial innovation allow them to bundle large numbers of loans into 
asset backed securities and sell them via capital markets to institutional and individual 
investors around the world – the new “originate and distribute” model.7 Securitization 
shifts loans from bank balance sheets to capital markets, where they are priced correctly 
and distributed optimally. This not only lowers banks’ risk, it frees up bank capital to 
create more loans. The celebratory narrative associated with the NFA applauds the 
incredibly rapid financial innovation in derivative products that has taken place in the 
past decade and a half because financial institutions and private investors can now easily 
use derivatives to hedge or insure against risk. Complex derivative products allow risk to 
be decomposed into its component parts, such as interest rate or counter-party risk. Thus, 
agents are able to buy only the kinds of risk they are most comfortable holding. Paul 
Volcker described this vision of the NFA as follows: “The general idea is the inherent 
risks can be minimized by unpackaging the institutional relationships, separating maturity 
and credit risks, “slicing and dicing” so that those risks can be shifted to those most 
willing and capable of absorbing them” (Volcker 2008). Securitization of their loans plus 
the ability to hedge whatever residual risk remained were supposed to keep banks safe in 
the new regime. The narrative asserts that because risk is transparent and properly priced, 
and scattered widely and thinly across tightly integrated global financial markets, 
systemic risk has been reduced significantly. This in turn implies that there is less need in 
the new system for large, costly government interventions.8  
 With the elimination of the Glass-Steagall prohibition against the union of 
commercial and investment banking in 1999, large commercial banks became integrated 
into giant financial conglomerates that include investment banks and mutual, hedge and 
private equity funds as well as bank-created SIVs. Though these conglomerates are 
clearly ‘too big to fail,’ they are lightly regulated in the NFA for two reasons. First, 
regulatory agencies are now controlled by people who accept the NFA’s celebratory 
                                                 
7 The phrase “it is argued” is included here because banks in fact held a large volume of risky loans on and 
off their balance sheets.  
8 In 2005, a group of high-powered Wall Street bankers created the Counterparty Risk Management Policy 
Group II to evaluate the potential for systemic risk under the NFA. Their report concluded that “innovative 
products designed to mitigate risk were seen as having reduced the likelihood that a financial cataclysm 
could put the entire system at risk” (New York Times, “What Created This Monster?,” March 23, 2008).  
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narrative and believe that modern financial markets should be largely self-regulating. 
Alan Greenspan, until recently the most important financial market regulator in the world 
is a disciple of free-market ideologue Ayn Rand. According to the Wall Street Journal 
“Mr. Greenspan says he didn’t get heavily involved in regulatory matters in part because 
his laissez-faire philosophy was often at odds with the goals of the laws Congress had 
tasked the Fed with enforcing” (Wall Street Journal, “Did Greenspan add to subprime 
woes,” June 9, 2007). Second, these conglomerates are thought to be so large and 
complex that regulators, as outsiders, no longer have the information required to 
effectively monitor their risk or control their behavior. They are therefore allowed to 
evaluate their own risk (and thus determine to a substantial degree their own capital 
requirements) through ‘modern’ statistical techniques such as value-at-risk (VAR) 
models discussed below. As George Soros put it:  
 Since 1980, regulations have been progressively relaxed until they have 
practically disappeared. The super-boom got out of hand when the new products 
became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate their risks 
and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. 
(Soros 2008) 
  
 Belief in the narrative about the efficiency of financial markets under the NFA 
permeated global financial markets for the past 25 years. Individual and institutional 
investors, financial institutions and government regulators were guided by it, and 
economists and the business press filtered all discussion about financial markets through 
its lens. In turn, belief in the narrative changed investors’ understanding of, and decision-
making in, financial markets. The conventional wisdom embedded in the narrative made 
individual and institutional investors willing to take on what would previously been 
thought to be excessive risk - in the stock market and internet booms of the second half of 
the 1990s and in the financial bubble from 2003 to mid 2007. The latter years were a 
‘perfect calm’ in financial markets. Interest rates, risk spreads, volatility and corporate 
default rates were exceptionally low, and levels of liquidity – even for complex financial 
products such as mortgage backed securities and collateralized debt obligations not 
traded in markets – were high, as were corporate profits. The narrative helped create the 
widespread belief that these conditions were permanent. This led almost everyone to 
believe that almost all investments – including purchases of high-return, highly 
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leveraged, complex, potentially illiquid mortgage-backed securities – were relatively 
safe. As Janet Yellen, President of the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank noted: “with 
advances in financial engineering promising to offer higher returns without 
commensurate increases in risk, the complex securities and derivatives that are involved 
in the current turmoil may have seemed especially attractive at the time” (Yellen 2008). 
 The new financial regime began to evolve in the early 1980s. Under its guidance, 
the growth rate of financial markets increased, accelerating after the early 1990s. There 
were clear signs in this period that this growth process was troubled. Time and again 
financial markets driven by speculative excess threatened to break down: World Bank 
research identified 117 systemic banking crises between the late 1970s and the early 
2000s (Caprio and Klingebiel 2003). And time and again they were rescued by Central 
Bank intervention through monetary policy, and through increasingly large lender of last 
resort bailouts that the narrative said should not happen. Thus the large financial gains of 
the boom were private, but losses in the crisis were socialized. These bailouts convinced 
individual and institutional investors that that gains in the boom would far exceed losses 
in the bust. This created a classic moral hazard problem that contributed to a secular rise 
in the absolute and relative size of financial markets, as well to increasing inequality. US 
credit market debt was 168% of GDP in 1981 and over 350% in 2007. Financial assets 
were less than five times larger than US GDP in 1980, but over ten times as large in 
2007. The notional value of all derivative contracts rose from about three times global 
GDP in 1999 to over 11 times global GDP in 2007. The notional value of credit default 
swap derivatives rose from about $6 trillion in December 2004 to $62 trillion three years 
later. In the US, the share of total corporate profits generated in the financial sector grew 
from 10% in the early 1980s to 40% in 2006 (The Economist, “What went wrong,” 
March 19, 2008).  
Anyone who understood the history of financial markets should have known that 
these trends were not sustainable. Anyone who understood the weak character of 
arguments presented by neoclassical economists in defense of perfect capital markets 
should have been skeptical of the new regime. Anyone who carefully observed the actual 
institutions and practices of the NFA should have seen that its celebratory narrative was 
mostly myth. And the fundamental problems with the NFA were evident to a small 
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number of analysts not infected with belief in the ideologically driven narrative.9 But the 
influence of the narrative, supported by academics, self-interested financial institutions 
and the government, blinded the public to the fact that this emperor had no clothes. It 
took the outbreak of the crisis that began in mid-summer 2007 and continues to this day 
to force a general recognition that almost every tenet of the narrative was wrong. This has 
become so universally accepted that even the world’s major regulatory bodies now – 
finally – acknowledge the deep structural flaws of the NFA, though the regulatory 
reforms they proposed in the aftermath of the outbreak have been superficial.10 The next 
section explains these structural flaws in some detail.  
 
III. Structural Flaws in the NFA Created the Crisis 
III. 1 The NFA is built on a very weak theoretical foundation11
The belief that capital markets are “efficient” and that, therefore, they price risk 
and return correctly, is a necessary condition for acceptance of the NFA’s rejection of 
serious government regulation of financial markets. This belief is widely accepted in 
large part because it is supported by modern financial market theory. (It is also strongly 
supported by key financial market players because it is in their material interest to keep 
the government out of their business.) This support allows backers of the NFA to claim it 
has a ‘scientific’ foundation. However, the evidence provided by financial economics in 
support of capital market efficiency is surprisingly weak. 
To begin with, efficiency is neither a derived nor an observable property of 
financial markets. It is an assumption or assertion required to construct optimal asset 
pricing models that conclude that risk and return are properly priced. Eugene Fama, one 
of the creators of efficient financial market theory, argues that “models of market 
equilibrium start with the presumption that markets are efficient” (FRB Minneapolis, The 
Region, “Interview with Eugene Fama,” December 2007, italics added).  The assumption 
is that all agents use all relevant information about securities correctly in the price setting 
process in financial markets. In neoclassical models, this information is the correct 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Crotty 2007 for a prescient analysis that concluded that a systemic crisis was likely. 
Warnings of a coming crisis can also be found on Nouriel Roubini’s website. 
10 See, for example, the report on the causes of the crisis by the Financial Stability Forum 2008. 
11 Tom Bernardin provided helpful research assistance for this section.  
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expectation of the distributions of future cash flows associated with each security – or 
‘rational’ expectations. These are the vaunted knowable future “fundamentals” of the 
theory. The efficient financial market assumption “is not empirically testable unless some 
equilibrium model of security returns is specified” (Beaver 1981, p. 28). The canonical 
models of capital asset pricing insert this assumption into a theory of optimal equilibrium 
price formation based on agent utility maximization in perfectly competitive markets.12
To those not committed to the methods of neoclassical financial economists, their 
models of optimal asset pricing might be best understood as intellectual exercises in 
which the theorist asks the question: what is the minimum set of assumptions needed to 
generate the desired conclusion that capital markets price risk and return correctly. An 
alternative method of analysis would be to begin with a set of realistic assumptions about 
financial markets and ask: what theory of the behavior of financial markets can be 
derived from these assumptions? This is the method associated with the work of Keynes 
and Minsky. It disappeared from polite discourse in the NFA era, though it sprung to life 
again when the crisis hit.  
The methodological foundation of neoclassical economics is the assertion that the 
realism of assumptions does not matter in evaluating the validity of the conclusions. 
Moreover, it is widely believed that economists should privilege theories whose 
conclusions are consistent with received wisdom. Consider the following comment by 
William Sharpe in a seminal article on the capital asset pricing model that helped win 
him the Nobel Prize.  
 Needless to say, [the assumptions of the model] are highly restrictive and 
undoubtedly unrealistic assumptions. However, since the proper test of a theory is 
not the realism of its assumptions, but the acceptability of its implications, and 
since these assumptions imply equilibrium conditions which form a major part of 
classical financial doctrine, it is far from clear that this formulation should be 
rejected…” (1964, p. 434).  
 
Since classical financial doctrine asserts that competitive financial markets are efficient, 
the fact that it takes a large number of bizarrely unrealistic assumptions to demonstrate 
                                                 
12 These models assume that financial markets are never out of equilibrium because they cannot deal with 
disequilibrium dynamics. 
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the efficiency of capital markets does not give mainstream financial economists reason to 
doubt the conclusion.   
 The proposition that crudely unrealistic assumptions are not inferior to realistic 
assumptions in theory construction must be distinguished from the more reasonable 
proposition that some degree of abstraction - or approximation of reality - is necessary in 
theory building. The latter simply asserts the necessity of using simplifying assumptions 
because the world is too complex to fully incorporate in theory. The methodological 
debate, therefore, is not about whether abstraction is necessary, but rather whether or not 
we should favor theories whose assumptions are not excessively and unnecessarily at 
odds with the reality we wish to theorize.  
 Rejection of neoclassical methodology does not imply lack of appreciation for the 
insights incorporated in canonical theories such as the CAPM. Modern portfolio theory 
culminated in the CAPM, which formalized the idea that when security prices are not 
perfectly correlated, diversification of securities in portfolios can reduce risk for a given 
level of return. It suggests that the price of a security should be strongly influenced by its 
covariance with the expected future returns of the whole portfolio of securities; it is this 
covariance rather than the variance of its own returns that is the right measure of its risk 
in the model. It also formalized the eternal truth that in properly functioning markets you 
cannot obtain higher returns without accepting higher risk as well - a truth forgotten in all 
financial bubbles. The problems that infect the NFA arise because financial economists, 
for methodological or ideological reasons, feel the need to incorporate these useful 
insights into models of perfect foresight and market optimality - of ‘perfect markets’- and 
it is this need that requires the embedding of useful insights into a web of unrealistic 
assumptions that destroys its ability to guide our understanding of financial dynamics.  
 Space constraints do not permit a detailed discussion of methodology, but two 
points are important to emphasize. First, as noted, the assumption set used to generate the 
efficient capital markets conclusion is in stark conflict with the reality of financial 
markets. Among the core assumptions of efficient market theory are: investors know the 
true distribution of the future cash flows associated with every security; the degree of 
agents’ risk aversion is not influenced by financial market outcomes; liquidity is always 
perfect – agents can sell any asset at its equilibrium price at any time; markets are always 
 13
in stable equilibrium; no one ever defaults; and agents can borrow an infinite amount at 
the risk-free interest rate. Study of the institutions and practices of financial markets 
demonstrates the extreme gap between these assumptions and real world markets.  
 Consider the assumption that investors know the true future cash flows 
associated with all securities or have ‘rational’ expectations.13 This is appropriate for 
situations of ‘risk’ – as in roulette - where probabilities of outcomes do not change over 
time. But it is totally inappropriate for conditions of fundamental uncertainty in which the 
mechanism that generates future outcomes is always changing in ways that can never be 
known in the present.14 In mainstream financial theory future cash flow expectations are 
exogenous – they are not altered by financial agents’ decisions, and agents are assumed 
to be 100 percent confident their expectations are correct.  In real world financial 
markets, agents cannot ‘know’ the future because it does not yet exist. They have to 
guess what future conditions will be largely based on some process of extrapolation from 
the past. Their fallible guesses will influence their decisions and thus affect actual future 
economic and financial conditions in unpredictable ways. This makes expectations 
endogenous and creates path dependence and learning processes that the canonical 
models omit because they do not lead to perfect-market conclusions. In reality, 
expectations and the degree of confidence investors place in them change over time in 
pro-cyclical patterns. The longer and more energetic the financial boom, the more 
optimistic expectations become and the more confidence agents place in their 
extrapolative expectations-formation process.  
                                                 
13 There are models of efficient financial markets that do not assume that all agents have rational 
expectations, but these require yet additional unrealistic assumptions to arrive at their desired conclusion. 
For example, one can posit one set of irrational “noise traders” that form expectations of future security 
prices through extrapolation even though knowledge of the true distribution is available to them, and a 
second set that hold rational expectations. The argument is that the first group will make decisions that 
would lead to inefficient cyclically varying prices, but the second group will engage in arbitrage that forces 
prices to their fundamental values. (Note that in neoclassical theory there is no justification whatsoever for 
the introduction of irrational agents; it is completely ad hoc.) However, unless agents can borrow infinite 
amounts of credit at the ‘risk free’ interest rate’ and can be assured that the fundamentals will not change 
over time, the first group of  “noise traders” will induce rational agents to attempt to profit from trends in 
prices rather than eliminate them. If a rational agent knows that the fundamental value of a stock is $20, the 
current price is $25 and the likely price tomorrow because of noise trading is $30, she will buy the stock, 
accelerating its rise. A refutation of this attempt to preserve the efficiency property by assuming noise 
trading can be found in chapter 12 of Keynes’s General Theory.  Keynes argued that the market can remain 
‘irrational’ longer than arbitrageurs can remain solvent.  
14 See Crotty 1994 for a detailed analysis of decision making under fundamental or Keynesian uncertainty. 
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 Moreover, in a world of uncertainty, it is reasonable to assume that risk aversion 
is endogenous and varies with the cycle as well. Investors get both more optimistic and 
less risk averse as the boom rolls along, which causes system-wide leverage to rise and 
the pace of the boom to accelerate. When a crisis breaks out, pessimism sets in and risk 
aversion or liquidity preference spikes, causing investors to sell risky assets and rush into 
safe assets such as US treasury bills. This destroys liquidity in troubled markets so that 
assets can only be sold at a large capital loss. This accelerates the rate of price decline. 
That investor expectations and risk aversion in fact follow such pro-cyclical patterns is 
empirically demonstrated in a recent paper by two Federal Reserve economists that 
analyzes University of Michigan survey data (Amromin and Sharpe 2008). If 
expectations, risk aversion and liquidity are indeed endogenous and pro-cyclical, then 
mainstream theories that assume they are not will grossly underestimate the need for tight 
regulation. 15
 Second, mainstream methodology insists that the correct test of the usefulness 
of a theory is the degree to which its derived hypotheses – not its assumptions - are 
realistic or consistent with the data. (Why anyone would expect that hypotheses logically 
deduced from models with starkly unrealistic assumptions should be consistent with data 
describing reality remains a mystery to me.) Yet the history of empirical tests of the 
efficient capital market theories fails to come to a widely accepted conclusion about their 
compatibility with the data. If anything, these tests have been disappointing to supporters 
of efficient capital markets, which, according to their methodology, should have eroded 
confidence in the theory.16 In a survey of empirical tests of hypotheses derived from the 
                                                 
15 Some mainstream financial economists acknowledge that standard models of risk (as opposed to 
uncertainty) lose all explanatory power when turmoil hits markets. “The heart of the recent crisis is a rise in 
uncertainty – that is, a rise in unknown and immeasurable risk rather than the measurable risk that the 
financial sector specializes in managing.” The rise of uncertainty can in turn be explained by changing 
market institutions and practices: “Because of the rapid proliferation [of complex structured financial 
products], market participants cannot refer to a historical record to measure how these financial structures 
will behave during a time of stress. These two factors, complexity and lack of history, are the preconditions 
for rampant uncertainty” (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2008, p. 1) 
16 Mainstream methodology rejects the use of realism of assumptions as a criterion for testing the validity 
of a theory. Thus, the econometric tests of derived hypotheses must carry the entire burden of defense of 
derived hypotheses. Since the assumption sets involved here are admittedly unrealistic, one would assume 
that these tests would have to pass with flying colors in order to sustain support for the theory. Yet in the 
case of CAPM, mediocre to disappointing empirical tests have not generated skepticism about the validity 
of the underlying theoretical vision. Perhaps in practice there is no conceivable set of econometrics test that 
could lead to rejection of the theory. In a review of the methodology of modern financial market theory, 
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capital asset pricing model, Fama and French 2003 conclude that “despite its seductive 
simplicity, the CAPM’s empirical problems probably invalidate its use in applications” 
(p. 21).17 These failures led to a widespread belief among financial economists that the 
CAPM failed because it defined risk too narrowly. This in turn generated a wealth of 
econometric studies of models (collectively known as arbitrage pricing models) that add 
numerous and sundry additional variables to the risk measure of the CAPM. Since, in 
contrast to the CAPM, arbitrage pricing theory does not explain precisely what these 
other factors might be, the entire effort smacks of data mining. Once outside the confines 
of the CAPM model, there is no limit to how many or what kind of variables can be used 
to generate acceptable econometric results.  
 There are weaker tests of the theory. One is investigating whether new 
information is quickly incorporated into existing security prices. These tests have been 
less disappointing. Another is testing whether institutional investors fail to outperform the 
market as the theory implies.  This assertion has some empirical support, though it is not 
universally accepted.18 But this partial empirical success comes at a high price. Since 
these hypotheses do not depend on the assumption of optimal pricing, but rather are 
consistent with any theory of price determination, testing fails to distinguish between 
efficient capital market theory and alternative financial market theories such as those 
created by Keynes and Minsky and Marx.19 For example, even in a Keynesian theory of 
security price determination, news that some company had much higher profits than 
previously expected would be likely to quickly lead to a rise in its stock price. Therefore, 
these weak tests, like the stronger tests, provide no support for the NFA.  
 Given the stunning lack of realism of the assumptions of the canonical models of 
modern finance and the failure to find consistent empirical support for them, it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Findley and Williams have argued that  “in an empirical-positivist sense, at best [neoclassical financial 
market theory’s] implications could not be rejected by the available evidence - a test which many opposing 
models could also pass. It was therefore contended that the basic positivist notion that 'assumptions do not 
matter if the model works' had been subverted into 'assumptions cannot be criticized so long as the model 
cannot be shown not to work.'”(1985, p. 1). 
17 They also conclude that it is not clear whether the problem lies in the empirical weakness of the 
assumption of the efficient use of information or of the assumed model of agent optimization, or both. 
18 For a contrarian view, see Shiller 2005. 
19 A defense of the proposition that Marx’s theory of finance is compatible with those of Keynes and 
Minsky can be found in Crotty 1985. This empirical literature never mentions the fact that the weak tests of 
the theory fail to distinguish between neoclassical and Keynesian theories of financial markets in large part 
because their hypotheses are never compared to alternative views.  
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reasonable to conclude that belief in the narrative of the NFA is without solid theoretical 
foundation.  
 
III.2 The NFA has widespread perverse incentives that create excessive risk, 
exacerbate booms and generate crises. 
 The NFA is riddled with perverse incentives that induce key financial firm 
personnel to take excessive risk in financial upturns. These individual risks build up over 
time, creating ever higher leverage and increasing financial fragility. The rise in systemic 
risk fed by these incentives throughout the ‘perfect calm’ helped cause the global 
financial crisis. Any new regulatory system adequate to its task will have to deal with the 
micro problem of perverse incentives. 
 The celebrated growth of securitization rained down fee income throughout the 
system – to mortgage brokers who sold the loans, investment bankers who packaged the 
loans into securities, banks and specialist institutions who serviced the securities, ratings 
agencies who gave them their seal of approval, and monoline insurance companies who 
guaranteed holders of such securities against loss through the use of credit default swaps. 
Since these fees do not have to be returned if the securities later suffer large losses, 
everyone involved had strong incentives to maximize the flow of loans through the 
system - whether or not they were sound. This is the hidden downside of the new 
‘originate and distribute’ model of banking. Subprime mortgages were especially 
lucrative because they were packaged into high-yield securities in high demand from 
investment banks, hedge and pension funds, insurance companies and bank-created SIVs.  
 The main source of investment bank income has recently shifted from traditional 
activities such as advising on M&As and bringing IPOs to market to fee income from 
securitization and trading on their own account. Much of the trading is in mortgage-
backed securities, which they create and both sell to others and hold in their own trading 
accounts. Keep in mind that giant commercial banks are components of conglomerates 
that include investment banks.  For example, Citigroup was one of the biggest players in 
the mortgage securitization frenzy. The larger the investment bank, the more pronounced 
the strategy shift. Global M&As were worth $3.8 trillion at their peak in 2006, 11% 
higher than in the super year of 2000. Goldman Sachs, the number one bank in the M&A 
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business that year, achieved record profits from this sector in 2006. Yet an astounding 
70% of Goldman’s total net income came from gambling with the firm’s own capital, an 
unprecedented dependence on this source of income (The Economist, “Streets ahead of 
the rest,” December 23, 2006, p. 111). In 2006, even New York Stock Exchange brokers 
and dealers, a group that includes mostly small firms not involved with securitization as 
well as giant investment banks, made $21 billion from securities underwriting and $35 
billion from trading gains (Securities Industry Association, Securities Industry Factbook 
2007, p38). The potential risk involved in this part of the business is enormous.  
 The spectacular profits associated with these high risk strategies triggered equally 
spectacular compensation gains for the top executives, traders and other ‘rainmakers’ in 
the investment banking world. Top traders and executives receive giant bonuses in years 
in which risk-taking behavior generates high profits. In 2006, Goldman Sachs’ bonus 
pool totaled $16 billion – an average bonus of $650,000 unequally distributed across 
Goldman’s 25,000 employees.20 Wall Street’s top traders received bonuses up to $50 
million that year. In spite of the investment bank disasters of the second half of 2007, the 
average Wall Street bonus fell only 4.7% even as the profits of all New York Stock 
Exchange members fell by 46%.21 Overall, the five largest investment banks – Merrill, 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns – paid out about 
$66 billion in compensation in 2007, including an estimated $40 billion in bonuses. 
Despite the profit decline, the bonus figure was higher than the $36 billion in 2006 
(Financial Times, “Merrill vows to reform bonus,” January 18, 2008). The combination 
of modest bonus declines and a sharp drop in profits caused bonuses as a percent of net 
revenue for the top seven investment banks to rise from about 45% in 2006 to over 70% 
in 2007 (New York State Comptroller’s Office 2008).  
 In boom years, investment bank profits and bonuses are maximized by high 
leverage. Rising leverage was responsible for half the increase in return on investment 
bank equity in the four years ending in mid 2007. High leverage creates high risk. But 
since investment banking rainmakers do not have to return their bubble year bonuses 
                                                 
20 In 2005, Goldman’s partners alone, about 1% of the workforce, received 8% of net revenue (Folkman, 
Froud, Sukhdev, and Williams 2007).  
21 Investment banking bonuses are projected to decline by about 30% in 2008 (Financial Times, “Cost of a 
wrong turn,” August 4, 2008).  
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when the inevitable crisis brought on by excessive risk taking occurs, they have a 
powerful incentive to continue the high-risk strategies that enriched them over the course 
of the boom. 
 The general partners in the booming hedge and private equity fund industries have 
similarly skewed payoff systems. They typically charge 2 percent of assets managed plus 
20 percent of profits. Since high returns both raise profit and help increase the size of 
assets under management, there are strong reasons to take risk in pursuit of high returns 
in a boom. The general partners do not have to return their boom-induced fortune in the 
downturn. Risky strategies are especially attractive in periods when financial asset prices 
have been rising for some time, because the longer the boom, the more likely it becomes 
that investors will believe that high-returns chasing is not an excessively risky strategy. In 
addition, there is an incentive to take risks that are not easily observable to clients – such 
as in derivatives markets.22 Keep in mind that investment banks and financial 
conglomerates have their own hedge and private equity funds. Goldman Sachs Asset 
Management was reported in 2006 to be one of the world’s largest hedge funds, with 
about $21 billion in capital. Goldman’s private equity arm is also one of the world’s 
biggest, involved in $51 billion in private equity deals in 2006 (S&P 2006, pp. 13 and 
14).  
 Mutual fund managers’ pay also rises with the size of assets under their control, 
and assets are maximized in a boom by earning the high returns associated with risky 
investments. This is an industry susceptible to herd behavior. Contracts to manage large 
portfolios can be lost by a firm if its returns fall below the industry average for as little as 
six months. When asset bubbles take hold, institutional investors have a strong incentive 
to follow others in pursuit of capital gains even at the risk of absorbing losses when the 
bubble bursts. If many companies are making high returns by investing in bubble-driven 
assets with very high short-term capital gains, then even managers who are convinced the 
bubble will deflate in the near future must follow the herd. If they don’t, they will show 
sub-par returns and lose business. If they follow the herd and the bubble bursts, all firms 
will suffer losses, so no firm will lose its competitive advantage.  In their drive to meet or 
                                                 
22 For example, if you sell insurance against the default of a loan through a credit default swap, the 
payments you receive are additions to profit, but the contingent loss should the loan default appears 
nowhere on the balance sheet. 
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exceed average industry returns, a growing number of mutual funds are investing serious 
money in private equity and hedge funds. Empirical evidence shows that institutional 
investors suffer smaller percentage losses in their client base in years in which they 
achieve below average returns than the percentage gains they earn in years with above 
average returns (Rajan 2005, p 18). This clearly motivates higher risk taking.  
 Pension funds and insurance companies also contributed to the buildup of risk in 
the system. Pension funds are driven to take excessive risk because they face rising 
payout demands as society moves from a preponderance of young savers to a rising 
percentage of older dis-savers. Required payouts are actuarially determined. If fund 
assets are insufficient to achieve the necessary income flows with lower-return safe 
investments such as Treasury or high-rated corporate bonds, pension funds must increase 
risk to earn higher returns. This is widely recognized in the financial press. “American 
pension funds have analysed their liabilities. They need more than 6% to make up the 
shortfalls in their funds. .. They have to roll the dice to get it” (The Economist, “Alpha 
betting” September 16, 2006, p 84). Insurance companies face similar problems, 
especially in periods of low interest rates that follow periods of high interest rates, such 
as 2001 to 2005.23 Life insurance policies and annuities sold in a high interest era become 
less profitable if the returns the companies receive on their assets decline substantially 
over the life of the policy. Insurance companies are thus pressured to seek higher returns 
even at the cost of higher risk. An IMF report concludes: “To achieve returns similar to 
those they achieved in the past, many pension funds and insurers have had to increase 
their exposure to higher-yielding alternative asset classes, including private equity funds” 
(IMF 2007, p. 12).  
 Pressured to raise returns, these companies have become major investors in MBSs 
and CDOs, and in hedge and private equity funds. Moreover, in recent years they entered 
the growing credit default swap market, where they provide insurance against loan 
default to banks and other agents. The incidence of corporate defaults hit historic lows in 
the ‘perfect calm,’ so sellers of default insurance received an uninterrupted flow of 
premium payments. Since these payments constitute an addition to revenue and profit but 
                                                 
23 Institutional investors’ incentive to take high risk is generally strongest in periods with low interest rates. 
When interest rates are high, so is the opportunity cost of investing in a high risk asset instead of a low risk 
bond, and conversely.  
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do not increase balance sheet assets, they raise the return on assets and equity without 
raising perceived risk. It was thus quite tempting to maximize the sale of loan default 
insurance.24  
Credit rating agencies that play a crucial role in the NFA were also infected by 
perverse incentives. Under Basle I rules, banks were required to hold 8% of core or tier 
one capital against their total risk-weighted assets. Since ratings agencies determined the 
risk weights on many assets, they strongly influenced bank capital requirements. High 
ratings mean less required capital. They therefore facilitate higher leverage, higher profit 
and higher bonuses, but create higher risk as well. Moreover, important financial 
institutions are not permitted to hold assets with less than a AAA rating from one of the 
major rating companies.25 The Financial Times reports that:  
 global regulators are re-examining the degree to which their own regulatory 
frameworks have become dependent on credit ratings. Over the last decade, the 
regulators have allowed credit ratings to be used to determine the appropriate 
level of capital that banks need to hold. This pattern has prompted criticism that 
these ratings have now been "hardwired" into the system. Some observers, 
including the Financial Stability Forum, have indicated that the official 
recognition of credit ratings for a variety of securities regulatory purposes may 
have played a role in encouraging investors' over-reliance on ratings. (Financial 
Times, “Regulators raise fears over 'hardwired' credit ratings,” June 12 2008.) 
 
 The recent global financial boom and crisis might not have occurred at all if credit 
rating agencies had been unwilling to give absurdly high ratings to illiquid, non-
transparent, structured financial products such as MBSs, CDOs and CLOs (collateralized 
loan obligations).  
                                                 
24 Long-term performance is not a dominant concern of investment banks, hedge and private equity fund 
managers and other institutional investors: they have short-run horizons. As a Wall Street Journal piece put 
it: “Hedge-fund managers, buyout artists and bankers get paid for short-term performance. The long-term 
consequences of their actions are someone else’s problem” (“Sketchy loans abound,” March 27, 2007, p. 
C1, p.11) 
 
25 Frank Partnoy noted how institutional investors facing regulatory constraints on risk taking used ratings 
agencies to allow them to buy risky high-yield complex products. He asks with reference to constant 
proportion debt obligations, “financial Frankensteins that the agencies flawed mathematical models said 
were low risk”: “Does anyone believe parties paid for triple A ratings of such instruments because these 
ratings gave them valuable information? More likely, ratings were valuable because they permitted 
investors to buy something triple A that paid 20 times the spread of other triple A instruments” (Partnoy 
2008). 
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 Had the securities initially received the risky ratings they now carry, many 
pension and mutual funds would have barred by their own rules from buying 
them. Hedge funds and other sophisticated investors might have treated them 
more cautiously. And some mortgage lenders might have pulled back from 
making the loans in the first place, without such a ready secondary market for 
them. (Wall Street Journal, “How Ratings Firms’ Calls Fueled Subprime Mess,” 
August 15, 2007) 
  
As explained below, these immensely complex products cannot be sold on exchanges 
because there is no agreed upon way to evaluate their risk. Thus, demand for these 
products could not have developed as rapidly as it did if ratings agencies had not 
provided the crucial risk evaluations needed to price them. CDOs could not have been 
sold to institutional investors such as pension and mutual funds that were prohibited by 
law from holding risky securities were it not for the central regulatory role given to 
private credit ratings agencies in the NFA. The fact that the agencies rated 80 percent of 
CDO tranches AAA, and that regulators and financial analysts acted as if these ratings 
were as solid as the AAA ratings given to the safest corporate bonds, were necessary 
conditions for the recent financial boom in mortgage based securities to take place.26  
 Ratings agencies are paid by the investment bank whose product they rate. Their 
profits therefore depend on whether they keep banks happy.27 In 2005, more than 40% of 
Moody's ratings revenue came from rating securitized debt (Knowledge@Wharton,  
“Regulation-induced Innovation: The Role of the Central Bank in the Subprime Crisis,” 
July 9, 2008). If one agency gave a realistic assessment of the high risk associated with 
CDOs while others did not, that firm would see its profit and market share plummet. 
Thus, it made sense for investment banks to shop their CDOs around, looking for the 
agency that would give them the highest ratings, and it made sense for agencies to 
provide excessively optimistic ratings.28 If ratings had been done by government 
                                                 
26 The Economist made the following observation on the deep roots of ratings agencies in the regulatory 
system. “The Fed has been offering 85% of face value for AAA-rated paper presented at its discount 
window, even collateralized debt obligations stuffed with subprime mortgages (as long as they are not – yet 
– impaired). Josh Rosner, a critic of the ratings agencies, thinks it extraordinary that, despite their obvious 
flaws, they “continue essentially regulate the behavior of even the central bank”” (“Paper losses,” August 
23, 2007).  
27 “Rating services such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings are typically paid upfront for 
their assessment of a bond. Later on, if the rating is downgraded, a rating service doesn't have to give back 
any of those fees” (Wall Street Journal, “Deal fees under fire amid mortgage crisis,” January 17, 2008).  
28 A report by the Securities and Exchange Commission released in July 2008 concluded that “Credit rating 
firms put profits ahead of quality controls.” “The 10-month examination uncovered poor disclosure 
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institutions or if agencies were paid by buyers rather than sellers of CDOs, these 
securities would not have grown so rapidly.  
 Note that ratings agency compensation practices are procyclical. In the boom, 
complex products get excessively optimistic ratings that reinforce the boom’s 
momentum. But when the crisis hits, agencies are widely criticized by investors and 
regulators for rosy ratings that eventuate in large losses. In response, agencies drastically 
cut ratings, and this reinforces the dynamics of collapse.  
 Paul Volcker found asymmetric compensation structures to be a major flaw in the 
NFA.  
 Perhaps most insidious of all in discouraging discipline has been pervasive 
compensation practices. In the name of properly aligning incentives, there are 
enormous rewards for successful trades and deals and for loan originators. The 
mantra of aligning incentives seems to be lost in the failure to impose 
symmetrical losses – or frequently any loss at all - when failures ensue. (Volcker 
2008).  
 
 Former IMF chief economist Raghuram Rajan’s overview of the risk-creating 
effects of the financial system’s compensation structure is worth considering at length.  
 The surest way to make profits in finance is to take on risk, which is why their 
paymasters attempt to limit the risk they take through risk management. But as the 
cycle grows old without risks showing up, and as the Goldman Sachs of the world 
make enormous profits and bonuses by taking precisely the kind of risks that the 
risk manager says the banker should not take, the risk manager loses credibility 
and power. … Moreover, there are so many ways of making money while 
seemingly not taking risk. For instance, a manager can enter the credit derivative 
market to sell guarantees against a company defaulting. Essentially, he will 
collect a steady premium in ordinary times from that premium income [and] will 
look like a genius, making money for nothing and returns for free. With very 
small probability, however, the company will default, forcing the guarantor to pay 
out a large amount. The investment managers are thus selling disaster insurance 
or, equivalently, taking on …“tail” risks, which produce a positive return most of 
the time as compensation for a rare very negative return. Indeed, this could 
generate similar behavior to that of the bureaucratic fund manager. I buy the AAA 
tranche of a CDO, not because I am confused by the rating, but because I am 
selling a deep, out of the money put option, which will give me a steady return 
most of the time, but default with serious adverse consequences occasionally. By 
the time it defaults, I have hopefully made my money and am enjoying my own 
                                                                                                                                                 
practices, a lack of policies and procedures guiding the analysis of mortgage-related debt, and insufficient 
attention paid to managing conflicts of interest, the report said” (Wall Street Journal, “SEC says Debt-
Rating Firms Sacrificed Quality for Profit,” July 9, 2008). 
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private beach in the Bahamas. A number of managers including Stan O Neill of 
Merrill Lynch did generate higher returns for their firms for some time, but alas 
we now realize it was hidden risk. Of course, his parting compensation [of $161 
million] did nothing to dissuade the rest of the flock from following his example 
in the future. The broader point I am making is that we need to think about 
incentives of financial market participants as an important factor in the current 
crisis. (Rajan 2008)29  
 
III.3 Innovation created important financial products so complex and opaque they 
could not be priced correctly and therefore lost liquidity when the perfect calm 
ended. 
 Financial innovation has proceeded to the point where important structured 
financial products such as MBSs and CDOs are so complex and so opaque that they are 
inherently non-transparent. As such, they cannot be traded on standard competitive 
financial markets, but are sold instead through negotiation between the originating 
investment bank and a small number of customers – “over the counter” (OTC).  
According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), there 
was $7.4 trillion worth of MBSs outstanding in the first quarter of 2008, more than 
double the amount outstanding in 2001. Over $500 billion dollars in CDOs were issued in 
both 2006 and 2007, up from $157 billion as recently as 2004 (SIFMA website). The 
explosion of complex MBSs and derivative products created large profits at giant banks 
                                                 
29 As economist Brad DeLong put it, high-risk investment strategies that fail to take in account disastrous 
events unlikely to happen in any given year but likely to take place at some point in the intermediate future 
will do better for financial rainmakers most of the time, than those that those that do take them into 
account. In the following quote a ‘black swan’ (or tail event) is a disastrous event that takes place every so 
often but is not easily predicted. In my view, the data suggest that events likely to send markets into a 
tailspin occur more frequently than DeLong suggests in his example.  
 Your strategy may have, say a 25% chance of going bust in the next decade, but that's OK for a 
fund manager -- because a 75% chance of being lucky enough to run the table and pocket 
enormous sums of cash and be considered a prince of Wall St is a good bet. And then even when 
the black swan event does happen, you've probably already pocketed a lot of cash and you really 
won't be blamed anyway, since plenty of others will be in similar straits and many of your 
customers will accept the explanation that your strategy was perfectly sound but that nobody could 
have been expected to predict the financial equivalent of being struck on the head by an 
asteroid.… The highest rewards and the greatest glory go to those managers who bring in the 
highest returns during 'normal' times at the expense of leaving their funds exposed to black 
swans.” (“Grasping Reality with Both Hands: Brad Delong’s Semi-Daily Journal,” August 17, 
2007).   
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and other financial institutions, but also destroyed the transparency necessary for any 
semblance of market efficiency.30  
 For some time after a new derivative product is introduced, it has a niche market 
with high profit margins. Eventually many products become standardized and can be sold 
by any large bank. These ‘commoditized’ or ‘plain vanilla’ products end up being 
exchange traded, with transparent bid and asked prices available in real time on the 
Bloomberg website. Exchange traded derivatives are sold in a highly competitive market, 
with low profit margins. Thus, banks had a strong incentive to create products so 
complex that they could not be sold on exchanges at all.31 Eighty percent of derivatives 
are now sold over-the-counter in non-transparent private deals. Such agreements are 
characterized by asymmetric information and unequal bargaining power that allows 
banks to generate high profit margins. Das argues that “In the OTC market, 
dealers…ensure that the clients do not know the true price of what is traded. The lack of 
transparency lies at the heart of derivative profitability. You deny the client access to up-
to-date prices, use complicated structures that are hard for them to price, and sometimes 
just rely on their self-delusion” (2006, p. 126, emphasis added).32 The need for 
investment banks to create ever more complex derivative products is a key driver of 
financial bubbles.   
Consider the CDO. A mortgage backed CDO converts the cash flows from the 
mortgages in its domain into tranches or slices with different risk characteristics, and sells 
the tranches to investors. Several thousand mortgages may go into a single MBS and as 
                                                 
30 They also made the investment banks that that originated and warehoused them non-transparent. “Bear 
Stearns’ failure to sense the early tremors was especially glaring. In 2006, it was rated as the best risk 
manager among United States brokerage firms by Euromoney, a respected trade publication” (New York 
Times, “How Missed Signs Contributed to a Mortgage Meltdown,” August 19, 2007). 
31 “The desire to maintain a large stable of products that are not commoditized is one reason the pace of 
innovation is so rapid. “The half-life of most innovation-driven [products] is just three or four years” 
(Bookstabber 2007, p. 251). 
32 A recent Financial Times article on counterparty risk in the CDS market stressed the importance of high 
profit margins in OTC transactions.  
 One alternative at least for some of the most liquid or regularly traded types of credit derivative 
indices contracts could be exchange-based trading, but that would almost certainly see profit 
margins collapse at a time when many of the largest dealers in the market are nursing losses from 
the implosion of the credit bubble. Mr. Yelvington [a research analyst] says that if OTC 
derivatives went on to an exchange, huge amounts of bid-ask spread - the difference between the 
prices at which people buy and sell contracts - would dry up in a heartbeat. (Financial Times, A 
clearer picture set to emerge of state of troubled derivatives,” July 31, 2008) 
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many as 150 MBSs can be packaged into a single CDO. A CDO squared or CDO2 is a 
CDO created by using other CDO tranches as collateral. A CDO3 uses tranches of CDOs 
and CDO2s. Higher power CDOs are particularly difficult vehicles to model due to the 
possible repetition of mortgage exposures in the underlying CDOs. Synthetic CDOs use 
credit default swaps (or other credit instruments) as their collateral.33 In the early 2000s, 
synthetic CDOs became the dominant form of CDO issuance, possibly because the 
demand for CDOs was rising faster than the supply of mortgages.34 A textbook on credit 
derivatives explains a part of the price calculation process as follows.  
 The expected default payment is calculated by looking at the number of default 
references and loss at default for each tranche, given a certain [historical] 
correlation between the underlying reference assets. The correlation is 
mathematically handled through a Cholesky composition and the actual loss 
distribution is arrived at by running a number [10,000 to 100,000] of so-called 
Monte Carlo simulations, which generate a random number of defaults (as defined 
by the Merton model) in the underlying assets. (Chacko, Sjoman, Motohashi and 
Dessain 2006, p. 227) 
 
The authors caution that: 
 
 Even with a mathematical approach to handling correlation, the complexity of 
calculating the expected default payment, which is what is needed to arrive at a 
CDO price, grows exponentially with an increasing number of reference assets 
[the original mortgages]. … As it turns out, it is hard to derive a generalized 
model or formula that handles this complex calculation while still being practical 
to use. (p. 226) 
 
 The risk associated with mortgage-backed CDOs cannot possibly be priced 
correctly because no financial firm has the time, the incentive or the ability to evaluate 
the risk associated with each of the tens of thousands of mortgages that may be contained 
in a CDO. Even if firms had such information they could not use it to model with 
confidence the appropriate price for the CDO under all plausible future conditions 
because the relation between the value of a CDO and the value of the mortgages is 
                                                 
33 See Chacko, Sjoman, Motohashi and Dessain 2006 for an explanation of the intricacies of CDOs.  
34 “Between late 2003 and the middle of last year analysts estimate that between $1,000bn and $1,500bn 
worth of these deals were sold (Financial Times, “Plummeting values of synthetic CDOs demand action, 
August 19, 2008).  The article notes that these securities may have lost 50 percent of their value in the 
crisis, but “The bespoke and private nature of the synthetic CDO business makes it near impossible to dig 
up solid figures for the asset class as a whole.”  
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complex and nonlinear. This means that small changes in the value of mortgages may not 
disrupt the price of the CDO too much, but bigger changes will induce large and 
unpredictable movements in CDO values. The noted ‘quant’ Richard Bookstabber notes 
that many derivatives have “conditional and nonlinear payoffs. When a market 
dislocation arises, it is difficult to know how the prices of these instruments will react” 
(2007, p. 255).35  The complexity of the relation “grows exponentially with the number of 
reference assets.” And no one knows the true probability of possible future conditions 
anyway. Ratings agencies and the investment banks who create these securities cannot do 
due diligence on tens of thousands of mortgages. Instead, they rely on simulation models 
to assess the risk of CDOs and their tranches, but these models are unreliable and easily 
manipulated. They are ‘black boxes’: data is fed in and millions of lines of computer code 
spit out a rating.  
 Black boxes…make it difficult to identify the variables that drive the rating; they 
stay little about the stability of such ratings; and they allow the agencies to change 
their methodologies without letting anyone know they have done it (they just need 
to modify a few lines of code). In summary, black boxes leave everyone in the 
dark. (Financial Times, How to avoid a ratings fiasco: just say NO to black 
boxes,” July 9, 2008).36
 
In addition, because CDOs do not have a long history, there is inadequate historical data 
available on which to assess their current risk. It should come as no surprise that market 
operatives referred to the process through which investment banks and ratings agencies 
priced or marked CDOs as marking to ‘magic’ or to ‘myth.’37
 Many highly regarded financial analysts called attention to the inherent inability 
to price CDOs properly, but very few did so before the outbreak of crisis. Richard 
Bookstabber complained that: 
                                                 
35 “Highly rated CDO tranches only run into trouble when a large number of loans start defaulting, but fail 
spectacularly if that happens…” (Wall Street Journal, “How Street Rode The Risk Ledge and Fell Over, 
August 7, 2007). 
36 This article was reflecting on the news that Moody’s had been giving several complex derivative 
products excessively high ratings – “off by several notches - due to a mistake in code writing. Moody’s 
failed to acknowledge its mistake.  
37 When they are sold, there is no dissemination of the sale price. “The asset-backed debt market has no 
centralized network for disclosing prices” (Bloomberg, Subprime seizure solution may be found in hospital 
bill,” December 4, 2007). The article also quotes the owner of an investment fund on the complexity issue: 
“I wouldn’t loan my brother money if he hands me a bag and says ‘Don’t look in there, but trust me, it’s 
really valuable.”  
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  The accelerated pace of financial innovation and the ever-proliferating 
complication of modern financial instruments seem to defy the ability even of the 
products’ designers to fathom what is going on. And the new instruments are 
often thinly traded if at all, so values are guessed by simulation or calculation, not 
in the market. Sophisticated investors are left poorly informed about the risks they 
are baring; unsophisticated have not a clue. (Bookstabber 2007a)38
 
 New York University’s Nouriel Roubini considered the CDO market to be 
profoundly inefficient, and argued further that the narrative was totally misleading in its 
claim that the more complex products contributed to economic welfare. 
 [S]omehow greedy and clueless investors searching for yield bought tranches of 
instruments – CDO or CDO cubed – that were new, exotic, complex, illiquid, 
marked-to-model rather than marked-to-market and misrated by the rating 
agencies. Who could then ever be able to correctly price or value a CDO cubed? 
And for all the talk about the benefits of financial innovation what was the social 
value of a CDO cubed? There was indeed zero social value in this type of 
financial innovation that is closer to a con game than to a financial product of any 
use. (Roubini 2008)  
 
 Raghuram Rajan summed the whole process up nicely.  
 The original mortgage had been bundled into a pool, and then securities of 
different seniority sold against it, with the equity tranche bearing the first loss. 
This is a reasonable process, allowing risk to be split into tranches so that those 
with more risk appetite can hold riskier pieces. However, the financial engineers 
were not content to stop here. They created more complicated pools, bundling the 
securities sold by the mortgage pools into securities pools, and selling tranched 
claims against them. [A large number of] sub-prime mortgages were converted 
into a large number of AAA bonds and sundry lesser quality securities. Then 
those lesser quality securities were pooled and further securities issued against 
them to get more AAA bonds. Thus were born the CDO, the CDO squared and so 
on. Over …80 percent [were] rated AAA. What were the buyers thinking you 
may ask? Well, many were arm’s length buyers who simply did not have the 
capacity to delve deeper. Moreover, many were insurance companies and pension 
funds that had fixed obligations. In this era of low interest rates, they were really 
desperate for higher risk-adjusted yields to meet their looming obligations. The 
highly rated tranches were exactly what they wanted, especially if the AAA 
tranche of the CDO paid 40 basis points above corporate AAAs. They did not 
investigate the details of the underlying collateral, even if they could get the 
information or knew how to, for the rating was guarantee enough – many 
                                                 
38 Veteran financial analyst Frank Veneroso observed that “In the end the final product was unfathomable. 
There was no way you could look into it and assess any fundamental value. Its price depended entirely on 
the models and the ratings of the fee earning operators of the wondrous alchemical structured finance 
sausage machine” (Veneroso 2007).  
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investors were effectively corporate bureaucrats, and no one ever got fired for 
buying US AAA. (Rajan, Raghuram G. 2008.“AView of the Liquidity Crisis.” 
Speech given in Chicago (February). 
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/raghuram.rajan/research/A%20view%20of%20the%
20liquidity%20crisis.pdf). 
 
 The importance of the inherent illiquidity of these products to the dynamics of 
modern financial markets cannot be over emphasized. They cannot and do not trade on 
markets.39 Indeed, the value of securities not sold on markets may exceed the value of 
market-traded securities.40 Thus, the crucial claim in support of the NFA that deep 
competitive capital markets price risk optimally does not apply even in principle to more 
than half of today’s securities by value.  
 All canonical financial market models have to assume perfect liquidity - that 
securities can always be sold immediately at their ‘fundamental’ or equilibrium value. 
Without this assumption, the risk attached to securities is unknown – it all depends on the 
degree of market liquidity at the time of sale. Yet the key financial products that drove 
the boom and led to the crisis are structurally illiquid in the sense most agents will only 
buy them in a speculative bubble when expectations are high and risk aversion low 
because no one knows their ‘correct’ price. In the upswing that ended in mid 2007 market 
liquidity was largely provided by institutions such as hedge funds, investment banks and 
SIVs, entities that operated on high and rising leverage, much of it short term. But this 
source of liquidity was speculative, unstable and ephemeral – guaranteed to recede as 
soon as the bubble burst, and to evaporate completely once a crisis triggered an inevitable 
process of reverse leverage. In a crisis, liquidity provided this way is not like the liquidity 
provided by commercial banks backed by the Fed and the FDIC in the previous 
regulatory regime. It can evaporate in the blink of an eye. When its creditors deserted 
                                                 
39 One recent development in this shift toward non-public trading is the growth of “dark pools of liquidity,” 
the emergence of trading platforms where huge blocks of equity trades are made in private, outside the 
view of, and therefore the pricing dynamics in, pubic stock markets. The “point of dark pools [is] to 
provide anonymous block trading capabilities without impacting on the public price of a particular stock” 
and they are estimated to be responsible for 12% of all stock sales (Financial Times, “Exchanges moot 
greater links with dark pools of liquidity,” June 24, 2008).   
40 See (Wall Street Journal, “US investors face an age of murky pricing, October 12, 2007). In this article, a 
Goldman Sachs analyst is quoted as saying that “way less than half” of all securities trade on exchanges 
with readily available price information. The article shows that a subset of securities that do not trade on 
markets (that does not include derivates) have an estimated value almost 50 percent higher than the market 
value of the Wilshire 5000 total market index.  
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Bear Stearns, the investment bank’s cash holdings fell from more than $12 billion to $2 
billion in a single day. Claudio Borio from the Bank for International Settlements called 
attention to “The wide margin of error or the uncertainty that can surround the valuations 
of instruments for which a liquid underlying market does not exist (or may evaporate in 
times of stress)” (Borio, 2008, p. 15). 
 Consider the following example of the process of CDO valuation in an illiquid 
market and compare it to the narrative’s assertion that all traded securities are transparent, 
have a knowable fundamental value and always trade at or near that value in liquid 
markets.  
 When Wachovia Corp. took onto its books this summer a risky slug of a CDO 
with a $600,000 underlying value, it initially marked the value at $297,000 to 
reflect the meltdown in the CDO market, according to one person familiar with 
the matter. When Wachovia tried to sell the position, which was difficult because 
of its small size, it reduced the mark even more, to $138,000, this person says. Yet 
in an email to a potential buyer on Sept. 5, a Wachovia salesman indicated that 
the bank was willing to sell the position for $30,000 -- just five cents on the 
dollar. "The head of the group just told me they will hit a 5 cent bid just to move 
it," the email said. (Wall Street Journal, “US investors face an age of murky 
pricing” October 12, 2007). 
 
 The fact that all the big players know how illiquid these markets can quickly 
become creates a collective action problem. John Gapper of the Financial Times 
described it this way. 
 Banking in the 21st century…invites disaster for the industry as a whole because, 
when every bank tries to pull out of a fragile market at the same time – a 
phenomenon that occurs as soon as the first one breaks for the exit – some of 
them will get stuck. When everyone turns from buyer to seller, liquidity 
evaporates. This rush for the door this year left banks unable to value, let alone to 
trade, structured credit products. (Gapper 2007) 
 
 In the ‘perfect calm,’ with optimistic credit ratings provided by agencies paid to 
be optimistic, the yields on these mortgage-backed securities grossly under estimated the 
probability of capital loss. It was the under-pricing of their risk that helped create the 
rising demand for these products. Indeed, one of the most egregious flaws of modern 
financial market theory, and thus of the NFA, is its denial of a central fact that emerges 
from the study of financial cycles: risk is always under-priced in a bubble (as revealed by 
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the crisis) and always over-priced in heat of the crisis and its immediate aftermath (as 
revealed by the subsequent upswing).41  
 When the crisis hit these markets, liquidity dried up. CDOs could be sold, if at all, 
only at an enormous loss. Facing a wave of criticism for having led investors astray with 
overly optimistic rating in the boom, rating agencies belatedly slashed ratings for these 
products, exacerbating the problem. Since these securities were often purchased with 
borrowed funds, losses triggered margin calls, which forced the sale of safer assets 
because they were the only ones the market would accept. This spread the crisis across 
market segments. Since no one knew how much these assets were worth or who held 
them, credit dried up everywhere. Note that since banks are obligated to value their 
securities at their estimated current value, bank capital evaporated along with the price of 
these securities. In response, banks tightly restricted credit, first to non-bank investors 
and then to each other in the inter-bank market. This exacerbated the crisis and frightened 
regulators, who apparently did not fully appreciate the dangers embedded in the NFA.  
 
III. 4 Contrary to the narrative, giant banks took on enormous risk under the NFA  
III.4.1 The narrative claim that commercial banks distributed almost all risky assets to 
capital markets and hedged whatever risk remained was false. 
 The NFA narrative claimed that banks were no longer very risky because they 
sold loans to capital markets and hedged whatever risk remained through credit default 
swaps. Both of these crucial foundations of the narrative turned out to be false. 
 In 2007, The Bank of England expressed surprise at the explosive growth in the 
assets of giant global banks because they were supposed to be operating on the “originate 
and distribute” model. Rather than slim down as the narrative predicted, the on-balance-
sheet assets of large global banks grew at about 15% per year from 2000 to 2006. The 
BOE estimated that on-balance-sheet assets expanded from $10 trillion in 2000 to $23 
                                                 
41 There is a peculiar asymmetry related to the claim that markets always price securities correctly. 
Economists and Important financial market players insist that markets get prices right in the boom; 
therefore, ‘leaning against the wind’ by regulators to slow the boom is inefficient and destructive. But when 
the crisis comes, these same people demand that the government use aggressive monetary policy to slash 
interest rates to rescue large financial firms. Their justification for bailout is, in effect, that the market has 
priced credit incorrectly. Perhaps the appropriate claim would be that markets price securities correctly 
sometimes. 
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trillion in 2006 (BOE 2007). The regulatory regime obviously failed to constrain the 
sharp rise in leverage that enabled such rapid asset growth: regulatory capital expanded 
only by about 20% over this period: the asset to capital ratio exploded.42 The main cause 
of this asset growth was the incredible rise in bank holdings of MBSs and CDOs – 
precisely the kinds of securities the narrative assumed would be sold to markets. CDOs 
were especially attractive since they could be held off-balance-sheet with no capital 
reserve requirements. As of May 2008, estimates of total expected bank asset losses due 
to writedowns of mortgage related securities across the globe ranged between $269 and 
$600 billion (S&P 2008, p. 1). In July 2008, the IMF estimated that global bank 
writedowns were already $500 billion (IMF 2008). The ultimate losses will not be 
determined until all these problem assets are sold or reach maturity. 
 Banks kept risky structured financial products such as MBSs and CDOs for four 
main reasons, none of which were considered in the NFA narrative. First, to convince 
potential investors that these securities were safe, banks often retained the riskiest part – 
the so-called ‘toxic waste.’ Raghuram Rajan, put it this way:  
 Banks cannot sell all risks. They often have to bear the most complicated and 
volatile portion of the risks they originate, so even though some risk has been 
moved off bank balance sheets, balance sheets have been loaded with fresh, more 
complicated risks. In fact, the data suggest that despite a deepening of financial 
markets, banks may not be any safer than in the past. Moreover, the risk they now 
bear is a small (though perhaps the most volatile) tip of an iceberg of risk they 
have created. (2005, p. 3) 
 
Moreover, as the Financial Times noted, the sale of securitized assets “does not mean the 
bank has shed all its risk. Usually a lender remains liable for any initial wave of losses 
(say, for the first 10 percent decline in a mortgage values)” (Financial Times, “A tale of 
low rates and high technology,” January 15, 2007, p. 9).  
                                                 
42 Many observers believe that regulators failed to adequately increase required reserves as assets 
skyrocketed because they believed in the narrative. “This decade has brought a move to what bankers 
describe as an “originate and distribute” model – meaning that although banks still tend to make (or 
originate) loans, these are increasingly sold (or distributed) to other capital market investors rather than 
retained on the banks’ books. Since they have been selling these loans, regulators have assumed that the 
banks would be less vulnerable if loans turned bad. Thus, they have been willing to let the banks hold 
smaller cushions of capital relative to the volume of loans they create” (Financial Times, “Back on the 
books,” September 20, 2007). 
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 Second, given banks’ incentive to generate high profits and bonuses through high 
risk discussed in section II.2, they purposely kept substantial shares of the riskiest 
products they created to maximize compensation by maximizing short-term profits.  
 Third, the rate of flow of these securities through banks was so great and the time 
lapse between the bank’s receipt of a mortgage and the sale of the MBS or CDO of which 
it was a part was sufficiently long that at every point in time banks held or ‘warehoused’ 
substantial quantities of these securities. According to the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association, global CDO issuance fell from $186 billion in the first 
quarter of 2007 to $11 billion one year later, a collapse of 94% (SIFA website). The Bank 
of England estimates that the global issuance of all asset backed securities fell by about 
85% from the second quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2008 (2008, p. 6). Thus, when 
demand for MBSs and CDOs literally collapsed in the crisis, banks were left holding 
huge amounts of mortgages and mortgage backed products they could not sell on their 
balance sheets. Collapsing prices of these products generated large losses for the banks. 
 Fourth, when banks found the safest or ‘super senior’ tranches of mortgage 
backed securities hard to sell because their yield was low, they kept them themselves. 
However, the crisis slashed even the prices of the ‘safe’ securities. In late April of 2008, 
Standard and Poor’s estimated that “super-senior” AAA mortgage-backed CDO tranches 
“were likely to recover 60 percent” of their face value (Financial Times, “S&P delivers 
blow to CDOs,” April 29, 2008). CDO assets that were almost all classified as level 1 
assets in the regulatory schema (assets that have a clear market value) before the crisis 
were shifted en masse to level 3 (assets that have no market value and therefore must be 
valued by mathematical model) after the crisis hit. Under the BIS system, level 3 assets 
have much higher capital requirements than do level 1 asset. The cumulative effect of 
these developments was that the onset of crisis found global banks holding about $1 
trillion worth of these securities. 
 Consider Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, the two largest underwriters of CDOs in 
the three years leading up to the crisis. The Wall Street Journal estimated that in 
November 2007 Citigroup had $12 billion in warehoused mortgage related securities, and 
$43 billion in super-senior tranches of CDOs (“Why Citi Struggles to Tally Losses,” 
November 5, 2007). Merrill Lynch was a latecomer to the explosion of MBSs and CDOs, 
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but under CEO Stan O’Neill it quickly became a leader in the business. Merrill had only 
$3.4 billion in CDO origination in 2003, but in 2006 it posted $44 billion in CDO deals. 
Merrill’s rainmakers became addicted to the fees that flowed from financing CDOs, 
which reached $700 million in 2006. When problems began to appear in the subprime 
mortgage market, Merrill and most other big investment banks continued to buy all the 
mortgages they could to feed their profitable CDO machine in search of high bonuses.43 
In a comment that reflects both the power of perverse incentives and the destructive 
dimensions of financial market competition, Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince said in July 
2007: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as 
long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing” 
(Financial Times, “A bruising game of musical chairs,” November 15, 2007).  
 Fortune Magazine described the end game of this process.  
 Merrill apparently made a pivotal - and reckless - decision. It bought big swaths 
of the AAA paper itself, loading the debt onto its own books. ...The amounts were 
staggering. By the end of June, Merrill held $41 billion in subprime CDOs and 
subprime mortgage bonds. Since the average deal is between $1 billion and $1.5 
billion, and the AAA debt is around 80% of each deal, Merrill must have been 
buying nearly all the top-rated debt from dozens of CDOs. … Merrill's $41 billion 
exposure to subprime paper was more than its entire shareholders' equity of $38 
billion. That this huge position went unhedged astonishes everyone on Wall 
Street… (Fortune Magazine, “The subprime mortgage crisis keeps getting worse 
– and claiming more victims,” November 17, 2007).  
 
 The piling up of risky assets on bank balance sheets was stimulated in part by 
inept regulation. Under Basle I rules, capital requirements for on-balance-sheet loans 
were much higher than they were for assets, provided only that banks declared that these 
assets were being held for trading and thus would presumably not be on the books for 
long.44 This provided a strong incentive for banks to create and warehouse the 80 percent 
of CDO tranches rated AAA. Yet the kinds of assets banks were piling up in their trading 
books were longer-term, illiquid, risky assets whose price could plummet in a crisis. 
Gillian Tett, senior capital market analyst of the Financial Times, explained this 
phenomenon as follows:  
                                                 
43 Goldman Sachs made money by betting against the continuation of the housing boom. 
44 Regulators simply accepted bankers’ assurance that they would not hold these assets for long. This is one 
of many examples of what we might call “phantom regulation.”   
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[While] the Basel rules require banks to hold large capital reserves against the risk 
of credit default in their loan book, regulators only require small buffers for assets 
held in the trading book if these are labeled as low-risk, according to so-called 
Value at Risk models. Research by supervisors suggests that the proportion of 
assets held in banks’ trading books has risen sharply in recent years, often to 
above 50 per cent of those assets, apparently because of the favourable regulatory 
treatment… In April, the FSF said: “Global banks’ trading assets have grown at 
double digit rates in recent years, and in some cases represent the majority of a 
bank’s assets. (Tett 2008b. emphasis added). 
 
In a follow-up piece Tett showed how reckless giant banks had become once the 
regulatory restraint of the Golden Age regime had eroded.  
  The travails of UBS have served as a particularly painful wake-up call. UBS had 
quietly stockpiled tens of billions of dollars of so-called super-senior CDO 
tranches on its trading book, supposedly because it planned to sell these to 
investors (although it is unclear whether the bank expected such sales to occur.) 
The bank made little provision against the chance of these instruments turning 
sour, because the models implied a negligible risk of losses. When the price of 
these super-senior tranches collapsed by up to 30 per cent late last year, this 
created more than $10bn (£5.1bn, €6.4bn) worth of trading book losses for which 
the bank had set nothing aside… (Tett 2008c, emphasis added) 
 
 It is clear that under the NFA, regulators did little to restrain banks’ reckless 
attitude toward risk. Tett noted that regulators looking at banks’ trading books in June 
2008 discovered that some banks have been exploiting so many regulatory loopholes in 
recent years that they got away with posting virtually no capital reserves against assets 
such as senior tranches of CDOs. By mid April of 2008 banks had lost roughly $230 
billion dollars on their super-senior CDO holdings “either because they never sold them 
or because off-balance-sheet vehicles which bought a lot of this paper were forced back 
onto their balance sheets” (Tett 2008a). If regulators had been checking banks’ trading 
books all along, the crisis not might have reached systemic proportions. 
 Claims that banks hedged most risk through credit default swaps were equally 
shaky. For example, UBS hedged only 2-4% of the super-senior tranches of the CDOs it 
held (The Economist, “Wealth Mismanagement,” April 26, 2008, p. 91). Since the value 
of credit default swaps hit $62 trillion in December 2007 while the maximum value of 
debt that might conceivably be insured through these derivatives was $5 trillion, it is 
evident that massive speculation by banks and others, not just hedging, was taking 
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place.45 Reflecting on this incredible ratio of CDSs to insurable debt, Roger Altman, 
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury under Clinton, noted: “this growth had nothing to do 
with protecting against defaults. Instead, it was just betting on markets” (Financial 
Times, “Keep hold of the basic rules of finance, May 15, 2008). This is confirmed by 
Fitch Ratings, who report that 58% of banks that buy and sell credit derivatives 
acknowledged that “trading” is their “dominant” motivation for operating in this market 
while only 10% chose ‘hedging/credit risk management.” This “confirms the transition of 
credit derivatives from a hedging vehicle to primarily another trading asset class” (2007). 
 Moreover, the likelihood that a credit default swap on something like a CDO will 
lead to full payment in the event of a market crisis is uncertain. Large banks insured tens 
of billions of dollars in CDOs with monoline insurance companies, but since these 
insurance companies have miniscule capital relative to potential liabilities, no one knows 
how much – if anything - these hedges are worth to the banks. “These credit default 
swaps are casting a seemingly unnavigable pall over the bond insurance sector, because it 
is not clear whether payouts on these CDS will be very little or add up to tens of billions 
of dollars” (Financial Times, “Banks and bond insurers ponder CDS wipe-out costs,” 
June 24, 2008). One reason the Fed felt pressured to rescue Bear Stearns was that Bear 
was a counter-party in a huge volume of credit default swaps. 
 Securitization and the rise of credit default swaps did raise big-bank profits for 
several years, but, contrary to the narrative, they simultaneously raised bank risk and 
eventually created huge losses that for some banks exceeded their cumulative gains in the 
boom. “Citigroup, the biggest U.S. bank by assets, lost more money than it made from 
financial instruments based on U.S. subprime mortgages, a senior company executive 
said…” (Bloomberg, “Citi’s losses ‘greatly exceeded’ profits for subprime,” December 4, 
2007).The return on equity for the banking industry fluctuated between 12 and 15 percent 
from 1992-2006 in the new Golden Age of finance, but it fell to 8.2 percent in 2007 and 
will certainly be much lower in 2008 (S&P 2008, p. 10). From the end of 2003 to the end 
                                                 
45 In August 2007 the Financial Times reported that “the CDS market is now 10 times larger than the 
tangible cash bond on which they are supposed to be based” (Financial Times, “Unbound,” August 8, 
2007). It argued that a key advantage of CDSs for investors was that “the size of the corporate bond market 
is limited by companies’ need for funding, which in practice has been much less than the desire of investors 
to trade credit…” The shift of investment activity from the bond market to the CDS market and the CDS 
index market moved activity from regulated to unregulated, and from transparent to opaque.    
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of 2006, the return on assets for the 30 largest US banks averaged about 1.40 percent, far 
above its post WWII average. But in the third quarter of 2007, the downside of this risk 
appeared. The ROA fell to 0.86 percent, then collapsed to minus 0.12 percent in the 
fourth quarter of 2007 (Fitch Ratings 2008). This profit implosion reflected a global 
financial crisis that led banks to write down the value of their assets worldwide by a half 
trillion dollars by July 2008. 
 The collapse of the originate-and-distribute banking model raises the serious 
question of what new strategy banks can use to restore their profitability in the aftermath 
of the crisis. How will they regenerate revenues and profits now that they cannot 
originate and sell the structured products that drove the boom to global capital markets? 
Nouriel Robini stated the problem as follows.46  
 Capital losses are one-time problems; but destruction of the income generation 
process is a more severe and persistent problem that will require banks and other 
financial institutions to rethink their overall business model of credit risk transfer. 
But there is no clear and sound new business model for them: going back to the 
old days of “originate and hold” is not fully possible while the new “originate and 
distribute” model has shown all of its wrong and distorted incentives, risks and 
systemic failures. … It is not clear if banks and other financial institutions have a 
better model. (Roubini 2008) 
 
III.4.2 In the NFA, regulators allowed giant banks to measure and manage their own risk 
and set their own capital requirements which, given perverse incentives, naturally led to 
excessive risk-taking.  
 Deregulation and financial innovation have made the portfolios of the giant bank 
conglomerates that are at the center of the global financial system so complex that it is 
now impossible for anyone to make a reliable estimate of the degree of risk associated 
with them. In 1996 the Bank for International Settlements sanctioned the idea that, as of 
1998, regulators should shift responsibility for setting limits on giant banks’ risk from 
regulatory authorities to the banks themselves. This edict is a core component of the new 
Basel II regulatory regime. Banks would manage risk through a statistical exercise known 
as Value at Risk (VAR). Regulators “began allowing financial institutions to use their 
own version of [statistical] models to assess whether they were complying with rules that 
                                                 
46 If key financial institutions escape serious regulation in the aftermath of the crisis, history suggests they 
will eventually create new products that will be the vehicle for yet another crisis.  
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required them to reserve a sufficient cushion of capital based on the risks they took” 
(Partnoy 2003, p. 265). They were, in effect, permitted to set their own capital 
requirements. This ceded to banks, as it had to ratings agencies, crucial aspects of 
regulatory power.47
 VAR is an estimate of the highest possible loss in the value of a portfolio of 
financial assets and liabilities over a fixed time interval with a specific statistical 
confidence level. The standard exercise calculates VAR under negative conditions likely 
to occur only 5% of the time: all large New York investment banks used a 95% 
confidence interval.48 There are three fundamental flaws in this mode of risk assessment: 
there is no period of historical data that can generate a reliable result; VAR assumes that 
the substantial negative ‘shocks’ to the financial system that occur every five or six years 
cannot possibly take place; and the assessment of asset price correlations based on 
historical data used in VAR calculations always becomes grossly unrealistic when a crisis 
breaks out.  
 First, a VAR calculation uses historical data to forecast future financial market 
performance. VAR calculations implicitly assume that financial prices are governed by 
risk rather than uncertainty, and is thus in principle a treacherous endeavor. VAR 
typically uses data for the past year or less. Suppose the financial system is in the midst 
of a bubble such as the stock market boom of the second half of the 1990s or the housing-
based boom from 2003 to mid 2007 when the calculation is made. If data covering the 
past year or two are used in a maturing boom, the data will reflect the ‘perfect calm’ of 
the period – corporate profits will be high as will capital gains on securities, while 
defaults and asset price volatility will be low. Under these conditions, the true risk 
associated with boom-induced high leverage, excessively optimistic expectations and low 
risk aversion will be severely under estimated. The possibility of the outbreak of crisis 
                                                 
47 Wray observes that the new Basel proposals allow “larger banks to adopt “internal risked-based 
approaches” and to rely on external ratings agencies to assess riskiness of assets. Calculated risk ratings are 
used, in turn, to calculated capital requirements” (Wray  2006, pp. 8 and 9).  
48 The crisis may lead to a change in the details, but not the substance of the VAR based risk management. 
The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision recently expressed its intent to demand VAR calculations be 
done at a 99.5% confidence level, and that the expected losses be estimated for a full year, rather than for 
the 10 day period now used. They also proposed  a capital cushion for loans that considers not only default 
risk, as is presently done, but also risks related to ratings downgrades, price changes and market liquidity  
(Financial Times, Basel committee to tighten rules on how banks calculate risks, July 23, 2008). Keep in 
mind that the BIS only suggests regulatory reforms; it has no power of enforcement.  
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will not be considered because there are no crises in the data base. Alternatively, if the 
data period is extended to cover past crises, financial growth and innovation will have 
changed the system substantially, so the future is quite unlikely to resemble the past 
extrapolated. Data from many years or decades in the past will have little if any 
predictive power in the current system and the VAR calculation will therefore be 
unreliable. Thus, there is no possible historical data period that can make VAR an 
accurate measure of portfolio risk. 
 Second, VAR models assume that financial security prices are generated by a 
normal distribution. In other words, the procedure forces security price data to conform to 
a normal distribution whereas in fact they follow a “Taleb” distribution in which the 
preponderance of observations are ‘normal’ but upon occasion observations far from the 
mean appear – the well-known ‘fat tail’ phenomenon (Taleb 2007). In a normal 
distribution the likelihood that an observation several standard deviations beyond a 95% 
confidence interval will occur is infinitesimal. VAR models thus:  
 cannot deal with what concerns users most, namely the rare occurrence of major 
market disturbances. As some risk managers have pointed out, the assumption of 
normal distribution of returns (no “fat tails”) implies that events such as the stock 
market crash of 1987, the EMS debacle of 1992, or the Asian, Russian and 
Brazilian crises are not apprehended by such models. (Steinherr 2000, p. 114.)49
  
 Yet such tail events inevitably occur from time to time, though at unpredictable 
intervals in unpredictable forms. In August of 2007, two large hedge funds managed by 
Goldman Sachs collapsed, forcing Goldman to inject $3 billion dollars into the funds.  To 
explain why Goldman should not be held responsible for their collapse, CFO David 
Viniar said “We were seeing things that were 25 standard deviation moves, several days 
in a row” (Financial Times, “Goldman pays the price of being big,” August 14, 2007, p. 
                                                 
49 The President of the German Central Bank has stressed “the fact that financial instability is inherently 
non-linear. As one consequence of this non-linearity, risk factors are typically not normally distributed. 
Instead, their distribution is characterized by fat tails, implying that extreme values are observed more 
frequently than what would be predicted under the assumption of normality. Modeling non-linearity … is 
indispensable, given the central focus of financial stability analysis on default, contagion and spillover 
effects” (Weber 2008b). 
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25). Given a normal distribution, such an event would literally be unlikely to occur in the 
life span of the universe.50 The Economist observed:  
 The standard statistical approach to risk management is based on a “bell curve” or 
normal distribution, in which most results are in the middle and extremes are rare. 
It is the bell curve to which investors are referring when they talk about a “nine 
standard deviation event.” But financial history is littered with bubbles and 
crashes, demonstrating that extreme events or so-called “fat tails” occur far more 
often than the bell curve predicts. In a fat-tail world it is very hard to monitor how 
much risk you are taking on. (“Spooking Investors,” October 27, 2007.) 
 
  The use of normal distributions to estimate risk guarantees that the possibility of a 
serious financial crisis will not be taken into consideration, while the use of historical 
data from the past year or less guarantees that in a financial bubble risk estimates will be 
overly optimistic. Thus, the use of VAR allows banks to minimize required capital and 
maximize leverage and lending capacity, which maximizes profits and bonuses in the 
boom even as it sows the seeds of a future crisis. Nicholas Taleb explained that bank 
rainmakers want to use what they know is a fundamentally flawed risk management 
system in order to justify the excessive risks that enrich them in the upturn. “We have had 
dismal failures in quantitative finance in measuring these risks, yet people hire quants and 
hire risk managers simply to back up their desire to take these risks'' (Bloomberg, “Death 
of VaR Evoked as Risk-Taking Vim Meets Taleb's Black Swan,” Christine Harper, 
January 28, 2008).51  
Third, the asset-price correlation matrix is a key determinant of measured VAR. 
The lower the correlation among security prices, the lower the portfolio’s risk. Most 
VAR models assume that asset prices are jointly normally distributed and that future 
asset price correlations will be similar to those of the recent past. However, asset price 
correlations change even over relatively short time periods. For example, asset prices 
became more positively correlated as the recent boom progressed because asset managers 
adopted similar strategies in search of high returns: most investors poured money into all 
high yield assets certified as safe by rating agencies, raising the correlation of their 
                                                 
50 Taleb states that the assumption that security prices are normally distributed implies that “an episode 
such as the [1987] crash (more than twenty standard deviations) would take place every several billion 
lifetimes of the universe” (2007, p. 274). 
51 Reliance on VAR also causes investors to under estimate bank and financial sector risk, which sustains 
aggressive investor risk taking in the boom.  
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returns. “By deliberately investing in assets that have shown little correlation in the past, 
investors may be making these assets more correlated” (Wall Street Journal, “Bets for 
safely only left many at greater risk,” March 1, 2007, p. C1).52 More important, we know 
that in crises, the historical correlation matrix loses all relation to actual asset price 
dynamics. In market ‘scares’ and in crises most prices fall together as all investors run for 
liquidity and safety, creating a positive correlation unaccounted for in VAR calculations. 
An editorial in the Financial Times on the global asset price decline of February 27, 2007 
observed: “The price of almost every risky asset fell everywhere in the world.” It 
continued: “It is a reminder that, in a correction, and especially in a crisis, apparently 
unrelated assets suddenly start to do similar things: portfolios that look diversified may 
not be” (“A timely reminder about market risk,” March 3-4, 2007, p. 6).53
 Though the flaws of managing risk through VAR were apparent to anyone who 
understood the process, only a few important financial observers warned against the 
futility of standard risk management practices before the crisis broke out. Frank Partnoy 
was one. He described the problems with using VAR to measure risk as follows.  
 
 VAR was dangerous. It gave firms a false sense of complacency, because it 
ignored certain risks and relied heavily on past price movements. In some 
markets, VAR actually increased risk, because every trader assessed risk in the 
same flawed way. In other markets, traders [using different VAR models] 
calculated VAR measures that varied ‘by 14 times or more.’ … LTMC’s VAR 
models had predicted that the fund’s maximum daily loss would be in the tens of 
millions of dollars, and that it would not have collapsed in the lifetime of several 
billion universes. (Partnoy 2003, p. 263)  
  
Even New York Fed President Timothy Geithner expressed concern about these 
models late in the boom. 
 The foundation of modern risk measurement rests on a framework that uses past 
returns to measure or estimate the distribution of future risk. The stability of the 
recent past, even if much of it proves durable, probably understates potential risk. 
                                                 
52 For example, the correlation between hedge fund returns and returns on the S&P 500 stocks was about 
30% in the boom in the second half of the 1990s, but it rose to more than 90% in the perfect calm in 2005-
06 (Parenteau 2008).  
53 “In a deleveraging world, everything gets sold in the scramble for cash. Hence the waggish but prescient 
saying, in the last days of the bubble, that when the crunch came the only thing going up would be 
correlation,” (Financial Times, “The safest form of diversification is to avoid the herd,” August 25, 2008). 
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The parameters used to estimate value at risk can produce large differences in 
predicted exposures, especially at extreme confidence intervals. Estimating the 
potential interactions among these exposures in conditions of stress is even harder, 
due to the uncertainty about the behavior of investors and other market participants 
and because of the potential effects of financial stress on overall economic activity 
(Geithner 2006)  
 
 After the crisis erupted and the failings of VAR were undeniable, everyone joined 
in the chorus. “Reports from the IMF, the Financial Stability Forum, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and other august bodies have drawn attention in the 
past week to the appalling risk-management by many banks before the credit crisis” (The 
Economist, “Derivatives: Taming the beast,” April 17, 2008). Paul Volcker 2008 noted: 
“Mathematical modeling, drawing strong inferences from the past, has demonstrably 
failed to anticipate unexpected events of potentially seismic importance.” Larry Summers 
argued that:  
 allowing institutions to determine capital levels based on risk models of their own 
design is tantamount to letting them set their own capital levels. We have seen 
institutions hurt again and again by events to which their models implied 
probabilities of less than one in a million. Where it is desired to impose capital 
requirements, this should be done in a way that can be monitored by supervisors 
on the basis of balance sheet data. (Summers 2008)  
 
 In sum, in the NFA neither the bank conglomerates nor those who were obligated 
to regulate them could reliably estimate how risky they became in their reckless pursuit 
of high profits in the bubble. They were allowed to self-regulate via a VAR exercise 
structured to produce severe underestimates of risk in the boom and thus to leave banks 
with inadequate capital when the inevitable crisis broke out.  
 
III.4.3 Regulators allowed banks to hide risk off-balance-sheet to evade capital 
requirements, which lowered their capital/asset ratios and increased their risk. 
   In the NFA, regulators allowed banks to hold risky complex securities off their 
balance sheets, with no capital required to support them. Since capital had to be held 
against on-balance-sheet assets, the regulatory system induced banks to move as much of 
their assets off-balance-sheet as possible. The concept of the SIV arose in the late 1990s, 
“when large global banks…realized they could exploit loopholes in the Basel capital-
adequacy rules if they placed assets such as mortgage backed securities, in off-balance-
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sheet vehicles” (Financial Times, “A ray of light for shadow banking,” June 18, 2008). 
When the demand for risky structured financial products cooled off in mid 2007, bank-
created off-balance-sheet SIVs and conduits became the buyer of last resort for the ocean 
of new MBSs and CDOs emanating from investment banks. The SIVs were supposed to 
be stand-alone institutions that paid service fees to the originating banks, but to which the 
banks had no obligations. “The SPV is a legal entity created [by a bank] for … CDO 
transactions [that] is run separately with no shared management and no legal ties between 
it and the originating institution” (Chacko, Sjoman, Motohashi and Dessain 2006, p. 
193).54 At the end of 2007, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc. each had nearly 
$1 trillion in assets held off their books in special securitization vehicles.55 For Citigroup 
this represented about half the bank’s overall assets. J.P. Morgan generated nearly $3.5 
billion in revenue, or about 6% of total 2007 net revenue, from administering special 
securitization vehicles (Wall Street Journal, “FASB Signals Stricter Rules For Banks' 
Loan Vehicles,” May 2, 2008).56  
 SIVs borrowed short-term in the commercial paper market (and issued medium 
term notes) to finance their ‘purchase’ of mortgage backed securities from the originating 
banks. To enable this commercial paper to receive AAA ratings and thus low interest 
rates, the originating banks had to make commitments to provide their SIVs with lines of 
credit. The SIVs invested this short-term money in long-term, illiquid but highly 
profitable securities such as CDOs. Noriel Roubini noted that when  
 this garbage of CDOs (or CDOs cubed) was not fully distributed to clueless and 
greedy investors banks created off-balance sheet SIVs and conduits that would 
buy the leftover trash that no investor wanted to touch and repackaged it into 
structures that were financed with the most short term ABCP; these SIVs were 
then blessed with credit enhancement and guarantees of liquidity lines from the 
banks that made them de facto on balance sheet items even if they were de jure 
off balance sheet; but there were extra fat fees to be made from managing this 
toxic SIVs and conduits and thus the fee generation machine kept on rolling. 
“How will financial institutions make money now that the securitization food 
chain is broken?” (Roubini 2008) 
                                                 
54 The SPV or special purpose vehicle is the genus of which bank-created SIVs are a particular species.  
55  An article in the Financial Times gave a lower estimate. It claimed that SIV assets peaked at $400 B in 
July 2007 (Financial Times, “A ray of light for shadow banking,” June 18, 2008). 
56 SIVs also contributed to the non-transparency of financial markets. “The largest Citigroup SIV is 
Centauri Corp., which has $21 billion in outstanding debt as of February 2007… There is no mention of 
Cenauri in it 2006 annual filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission” (Wall Street Journal, 
“Conduit risks are hovering over Citigroup,” September 5, 2007). 
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 Borrowing short to fund long-term illiquid assets without a strong capital base 
was a dangerous game for supposedly independent SIVs to play, and competent 
regulators committed to preventing excessive risk would have never sanctioned them. 
Indeed, several years ago a group of Spanish banks approached their central bank asking 
permission to set up a network of SIV’s that would allow them to profit from off-balance-
sheet holdings of CDO’s without setting aside capital to support them. The Spanish 
Central Bank demanded that they post an eight percent capital charge against the SIV 
assets just as they would have to do if they were on balance sheet. This decision 
prevented the spread of SIVs to Spain (Financial Times, “Insight: Spain’s banks weather 
credit crisis,” January 31 2008 ). 
 When problems in the housing market triggered a wave of subprime defaults, the 
value of MBSs and derivative assets based on mortgages collapsed, revealing to everyone 
the house of cards on which SIVs were built. This naturally triggered an exodus from the 
asset-backed commercial paper market that forced SIVs to pay off debt they had assumed 
would be rolled over. US asset-backed commercial paper outstanding fell from $1.2 
trillion in July 2007 to $840 billion by year’s end (SIFA website). Ben Bernanke 
explained that “As the problems with these facilities multiplied, banks came under 
increasing pressure to rescue the investment vehicles they sponsored--either by providing 
liquidity or other support or, as has become increasingly the norm, by taking the assets of 
the off-balance-sheet vehicles onto their own balance sheets” (Bernanke 2008). Citigroup 
was forced to bring about $25 billion in CDO assets onto its books by the end of 
February 2008, which played a part in forcing Citi to take nearly $20 billion in write-
downs (Wall Street Journal, “Look Under the Banks' Hoods FASB to Re-Examine 
Whether Financing Vehicles That Added  To Woes Should Stay Off Books,” February 
29, 2008.)57 In late July 2008 analysts at Citigroup forecast that up to $5 trillion worth of 
assets might be forced back on to bank balance sheets, exacerbating their shortage of 
capital and further restricting their ability to lend to consumers and companies (Financial 
Times, “Rule changes could hit balance sheets,” July 21, 2008).58  
                                                 
57 By July 2008 Citi’s writedowns totaled $55 billion and the total writedowns for the four hardest hit banks 
were $167 billion (Financial Times, “Painful move becomes Thain’s only real option,” July 30, 2008). 
58 I assume that this figure includes derivatives measured in notional values. 
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 The combination of bank write downs on assets held on balance sheet and the 
increase in balance sheet assets caused by shifting SIVs on balance sheet seriously eroded 
capital. This in turn forced banks to reduce risk by cutting lending and raising interest 
rates both to other financial institutions and to households and nonfinancial businesses. 
The resulting credit squeeze exacerbated the crisis, which in turn raised the pressure on 
the banks, reinforcing the downward momentum of the crisis. New York Fed President 
Tim Geithner described this destructive dynamic made possible by change in the role of 
banks celebrated in the NFA narrative. 
 Banks could not fully absorb and offset the effects of the pullback in investor 
participation—or the "run"—on this non-bank system [of hedge funds, investment 
banks and SIVs], in part because they themselves had sponsored many of these 
off-balance-sheet vehicles. They had written very large contingent commitments 
to provide liquidity support to many of the funding vehicles that were under 
pressure. They had retained substantial economic exposure to the risk of a 
deterioration in house prices and to a broader economic downturn, and as a result, 
many suffered a sharp increase in their cost of borrowing. The funding and 
balance sheet pressures on banks were intensified by the rapid breakdown of 
securitization and structured finance markets. Banks lost the capacity to move 
riskier assets off their balance sheets, at the same time they had to fund, or to 
prepare to fund, a range of contingent commitments over an uncertain time 
horizon. The combined effect of these factors was a financial system vulnerable to 
self-reinforcing asset price and credit cycles. (Geithner 2008b) 
 
 III. 5 The NFA raised systemic risk. 
III.5.1  Heavy reliance on complex financial products in a tightly integrated, capital-
market based global financial system created channels of contagion and  raised systemic 
risk 
 The narrative claimed that in the capital-marked based NFA, complex derivatives 
would allow the risk associated with any primitive security to be divided into its 
component parts and sold to those agents best able to bear the risks involved. 
Adventurous but rational institutions such as hedge funds would create demand for the 
riskiest segments. Since markets priced risk correctly, no one would hold excessive risk, 
and since risk would be spread widely rather than concentrated in commercial banks as in 
the previous regime, systemic risk would be minimized.59 New York Fed Chairman 
                                                 
59 “Risk can be shifted to those who can bear it, and it can be widely spread among market participants…” 
(Brunnemeir 2008, p. 5). 
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Timothy Geithner stated in 2006 “In the financial system we have today, with less risk 
concentrated in banks, the probability of systemic financial crises may be lower than in 
traditional bank-centered financial systems” (Geithner 2008).  
 There are four major flaws in this argument. First, and perhaps most important, it 
implicitly assumes that the NFA will generate no more risk than the previous more tightly 
regulated bank-based regime, but only spread the given risk across more investors. 
Indeed, almost all arguments made by financial economists in support of the assured risk-
reducing character of innovations in complex derivatives are based on the assumption 
that distributions of future real-sector cash flows are exogenous, unaffected by financial 
decisions. Transactions in perfect financial markets thus simply redistribute the fixed 
volatility of the cash flows among agents, they cannot reduce it. However, the degree of 
risk associated with any financial regime is endogenous. Financial booms and busts are 
inherent in capitalist financial markets, but some financial architectures create more 
volatility or risk than others. The effect of a regime change on systemic risk depends on 
the amount of real and financial risk it creates and the way it disperses that risk, factors 
strongly affected by the mode of regulation. Derivatives can be used to speculate rather 
than hedge, and aggressive risk taking during financial expansions is hard-wired into the 
NFA. The evidence suggests that the NFA dramatically increased the total risk associated 
with the global financial system at the same time it distributed risk more widely, and the 
explosion of sophisticated financial engineering was a critical factor in risk creation.60
 Second, the narrative insists that derivatives unbundle risk, dividing it into 
simpler segments. But in fact, sophisticated derivatives such as CDOs, whose growth 
helped drive the bubble, rebundle risk in the most complicated and non-transparent ways: 
this is what financial engineering and structured derivative products do.61 These 
derivatives also add substantial ‘embedded’ leverage to the underlying or primitive 
products to enhance their profits. Das explains the layers of unseen leverage investment 
bankers added to derivative products sold to Orange County California. “Greenspan had 
                                                 
60 “Observations from financial wise men notwithstanding, it is not correct that the growth of derivatives 
invariably reduces risk... The sudden and exponential growth in derivatives, such as CDS, promoted risk. 
Derivatives facilitated speculation” (Financial Times, “Keep hold of the basic rules of finance,” Roger 
Altman [deputy secretary of treasury under Clinton] May 14 2008). 
61 See Bookstabber 2007b and Das 2006 for concrete examples of the risk- and complexity-augmenting 
properties of structured financial products. 
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been right – risk had truly been unbundled. We had packaged it right back up and shoved 
it down the eager throats of the wealthy taxpayers of Orange County” (2006, p. 50). As 
shown below, leverage increased dramatically in global markets in the boom along with 
the supply of illiquid high-risk derivatives, and leverage is a key component of systemic 
risk.  
 Third, innovations made it possible to hedge risk, but as shown above in the case 
of banks, they also made it possible to engage in highly leveraged speculation. In the 
boom, hedging via derivatives is relatively inexpensive, but key financial institutions 
have risk-seeking incentives and most agents are optimistic in the boom and either 
believe they don’t need to hedge or don’t want to accept the deductions from profit full 
hedging would entail. “Why fund managers don’t hedge liquidity risk better is no 
mystery. It…costs money and cuts into returns – and, of course, their fees” (Wall Street 
Journal, “Macquarie’s Liquidity Risk,” August 2, 2007). Conversely, after serious 
troubles hit financial markets, many agents would like to hedge their risk, but the cost 
becomes prohibitively expensive. For example, the annual cost of insuring $10 million of 
Bear Stearns debt for five year through credit default swaps was $40,000 in January 2007 
but $240,000 in January 2008. To insure Citigroup debt against default in credit market 
swaps was about $15,000 in May 2007, but $190,000 in February 2008. To purchase 
credit-default insurance on $10M of shaky Countrywide debt in January 2008, investors 
had to pay $3M up front and $500,000 annually (Wall Street Journal, ‘Default danger: 
protection costs worry the street,” January 10, 2008). A jump in the cost of hedging may 
occur quickly. The cost of insuring Countrywide rose from $75,000 in early July 2007 to 
$230,000 a month later, to $350,000 the next day (Wall Street Journal, “Reversal in 
Fortune,” August 11, 2007). 
 Speculation via derivatives became a common practice in large nonfinancial 
corporations as well, where Treasury departments were looked to as profit centers. 
“Treasurers argued that it was too expensive to cover risk all of the time. They would 
carefully time entry into and exit from hedges, all the while adding to the company’s 
bottom line. This was the corporation as casino” (Das 2006, p. 98).  
 Moreover, hedging often involves sophisticated, complex, dynamic derivative 
trading strategies. This form of hedging relies on the existence of liquid continuous 
 47
markets with low to moderate transactions costs. A typical dynamic hedge involves 
shorting the risky asset held and investing in a risk-free asset. The hedge adjusts 
whenever the asset price or interest rate or volatility changes in the market, which they do 
continuously. Every time the asset price declines or volatility increases, the risky asset 
must be sold; this is what makes the hedge ‘dynamic.’ When problems hit a risky asset 
market, price falls and volatility rises. Institutions with dynamic hedges must sell their 
risky assets, which accelerates the rate of price decrease, which in turn forces more 
hedged-asset sales. If many investors have made similar dynamic hedges and are selling, 
liquidity dries up and prices can free-fall. William Gross, the chief investment officer of 
Pimco, the largest global fixed-income mutual fund, complained that “Our current system 
of levered finance and its related structures may be critically flawed. Nothing within it 
allows for the hedging of liquidity risk, and that is the problem at the moment” (New 
York Times, “A new kind of bank run tests old safeguards,” August 10, 2007). In 
‘normal’ times, dynamic hedging can lower risk, but under conditions of market stress, it 
can prove dangerous for large institutions and therefore for the entire financial system. 
Automated dynamic hedging systems are especially dangerous, as the fiasco with 
automated ‘portfolio insurance’ schemes demonstrated in the stock market crash of 1987. 
 Fourth, securitization and funding via global capital markets created channels of 
contagion in which a crisis originating in one product in one location (US subprime 
mortgages) spread to other products (US prime mortgages, MBSs, CDOs, home equity 
loans, loans to residential construction companies, credit cards, auto loans, monoline 
insurance and auction rate securities) and throughout the world. The complexity of the 
networks linking markets together created immense fragility in the system. “Complexity 
also adds to the danger that any one part of the hyper-financial system can bring down the 
whole. Monoline insurers exemplify this kind of reef under the water. Their capitalisation 
is tiny – a few tens of billion dollars in equity – yet because they act as guarantors to 
hundreds of billion dollars in bonds, their failure would cause losses at almost every bank 
and insurance company in the world (Financial Times, “Editorial:The start of the great 
unwinding,” January 25 2008). The quantum jump in the potential for contagion created 
in the NFA raised systemic risk and, ultimately, triggered a severe crisis that affected 
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much of the global financial system. Bookstabber noted before the recent crisis erupted 
that: 
 The complexity at the heart of many recent market failures might have been 
surmountable if it were not combined with another characteristic that we have built into 
markets, one that is described by engineers as tight coupling. Tight coupling means that 
components of a process are critically interdependent; they are linked with little room for 
error or time for recalibration or adjustment. … The interplay of complexity and tight 
coupling that comes from combining liquidity with its derivative and leverage offspring 
is a formula for disaster. If all the eventualities cannot be anticipated (which is the case 
for complex systems) and if there is no time to rework the process (which is the 
implication for tight coupling), then when things go wrong a crisis will be unavoidable. 
Things will go bad, and when they do, they will quickly move from bad to worse before 
the cascade can be stopped. (2007, pp. 144-45) 
 
 When the Savings and Loan crisis hit the US in the decade after 1985, the 
ultimate cost, borne largely by the public, was about $200 billion, but there was no 
serious fallout in other national financial markets. When the crisis hit Asia in 1997-98, no 
serious damage was done to Western financial systems. However, the subprime mortgage 
crisis in the US that began in 2007 actually caused more banking losses outside the 
country than inside. An Institute of International Finance report stated that in 2007 and 
early 2008 US banks lost $166 billion in the crisis while European banks lost $200 
billion. The head of the financial stability division at the French central bank observed 
that “The risk of subprime mortgages has been dispersed to Europe and Asia, and within 
the euro area, bank losses were relatively widely spread” (Financial Times, “European 
banks harder squeezed by credit crunch than US rivals,” June 6, 2008).  
 Moreover, risk has not only risen and been spread more widely, the inherent non-
transparency of complex MBSs and derivatives and the lack of serious monitoring of 
large financial institutions has made it impossible to tell where the risk is located, which 
seriously complicates lender of last resort responsibilities of central banks. As Jean-
Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank commented: “There is now such 
creativity of new and very sophisticated financial instruments that we don’t know where 
the risks are located” (Financial Times, ‘Derivatives boom has created instability, says 
ECB president,” January 29, 2007).    
 The President of the German Central Bank recently acknowledged that the NFA 
created the contagion that led to the crisis.  
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 When transferring credit risks, one must always bear in mind that the transferred 
risks themselves do not vanish into thin air – they are merely elsewhere and the 
danger remains that they could resurface, possibly even in concentrated form. It was 
precisely such new concentrations of risk that led to the distress in the past few 
months threatening the existence of a number of financial institutions which were not 
themselves active players in the area of real estate lending. ... In a nutshell: New and 
complex instruments to transfer credit risks in combination with large banks engaging 
in an “originate and distribute” business model have amplified the consequences of 
the undeniable credit excesses in the US mortgage market. These new instruments 
exhibited several weaknesses that seriously hampered the efficient flow of 
information between originators and investors. In the end, the new instruments of 
credit risk transfer “distributed fear instead of risks.” (Weber 2008a) 
 
 The current crisis allows us to understand the good and bad news about the NFA. 
The bad news is that it created the worst financial crisis since the 1930s. The IMF 
estimates expected financial institution losses over the next two years at almost $1 trillion 
(Wall Street Journal, “IMF Urges Rethinking on Risk Management,” April 9, 2008).  The 
good news, apparently, is that capital markets have become tightly integrated and risk 
widely shared – but this spread the crisis everywhere.   
 
III.5.2 The NFA facilitated the growth of dangerously high system-wide leverage. 
 The structural flaws in the NFA facilitated the creation of dangerous leverage 
throughout the financial system. Rising leverage means rising financial fragility and the 
increased likelihood of an outbreak of systemic crisis. The leverage problem was made 
evident with the 1998 collapse of Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund that had 
managed to control $125 trillion in derivative products (at notional value) on a capital 
base of less than $5 billion. Regulators said they had to rescue LTCM to avoid a global 
financial meltdown. Yet the lesson of the 1998 crisis that high leverage is dangerous 
seemed to be quickly forgotten. Debt issued by US financial institutions nearly doubled 
between 2000 and 2007 – an astonishing rate of growth. Borrowing by US financial 
institutions rose from 62% of GDP in 1997 to 114% of GDP at the end of 2007. In 2004, 
large investment banks had asset-to-equity (or leverage) ratios of 23 but by 2007 this had 
increased to an historic high of 30.  By year’s end Morgan Stanley and Bear Stearns had 
leverage ratio of 33 to 1. It is estimated that half of the spectacular rise in investment 
banking return on equity in the four years ending in mid 2007 was attributable not to 
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clever investment strategies, but simply to higher leverage with higher risk (Financial 
Times, “Worst period for investment banking in 30 years,” April 2, 2008). Goldman 
Sachs used about $40 billion of equity as the foundation for $1.1 trillion of assets. At 
Merrill Lynch, $1 trillion of assets was backed by $30 billion of equity (The Economist, 
“What went wrong,” March 19, 2008).62 With leverage rates this high, any serious fall in 
asset prices can trigger a crisis.  
 Rising leverage was facilitated by the extraordinarily easy money policies of the 
Fed. To avoid a deep financial crisis following the collapse of the late 1990s stock market 
boom, the Fed began to cut short-term interest rates in late 2000 and continued to hold 
them at record lows through mid 2004. Since inflation was modest in this period, real 
short term interest rates were negative from mid 2001 to mid 2005. Financial firms of all 
kinds were thus able to borrow cheaply and use the additional funds to increase loans and 
generate higher profits in the boom years from 2003 to mid 2007. In the NFA, each 
government financial bailout leads to a bigger and more dangerous new crisis. 
 Noriel Roubini explained how easy – and how dangerous – it was to develop 
hyper leverage under the NFA. 
Today any wealthy individual can take $1 million and go to a prime broker and 
leverage this amount three times; then the resulting $4 million ($1 equity and $3 
debt) can be invested in a fund of funds that will in turn leverage these $4 millions 
three or four times and invest them in a hedge fund; then the hedge fund will take 
these funds and leverage them three or four times and buy some very junior 
tranche of a CDO that is itself levered nine or ten times. At the end of this credit 
chain, the initial $1 million of equity becomes a $100 million investment out of 
which $99 million is debt (leverage) and only $1 million is equity. So we got an 
overall leverage ratio of 100 to 1. Then, even a small 1% fall in the price of the 
final investment (CDO) wipes out the initial capital and creates a chain of margin 
calls that unravel this debt house of cards. (Roubini 2007) 
 
Consider the buildup to the collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds in the 
summer of 2007.  
 Documents show that they were simply taking investors’ money, leveraging it to 
the hilt, and then buying complex bonds called collateralized debt obligations, or 
CDOs, that were backed by subprime and other mortgages. … The funds’ 
voracious buying of lightly traded bonds drove down their yields, meaning 
                                                 
62 The risk involved in operating with such high leverage ratios was heightened by the fact that modern 
investment banks rely heavily on overnight borrowing on the repo market. 
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[Manager Ralph] Cioffi’s team had to buy more and more of them to boost 
returns. That meant more borrowing. Banks such as Merrill Lynch, Goldman 
Sachs, Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase lent the funds at least $14 billion 
all told. Cioffi also used a type of short-term debt to borrow billions more; in 
some cases he managed to buy $60 worth of securities for every $1 of investors’ 
money (Business Week, “Bear Stearn’s bad bet,” October 13, 2007).63   
 
Commercial banks appeared to be adequately capitalized during the boom, but 
only because a high percent of their assets – for some more than half – was kept off-
balance-sheet. In fact, they were dangerously leveraged. A respected association of 
international accountants estimated that off-balance-sheet accounting “allowed trillions in 
assets to escape close scrutiny” (Financial Times, “Off-balance sheet rules for banks 
‘irretrievably broken’ say experts,” April 10, 2008, p. 15). If these assets had been kept 
on balance sheet, the excessive leverage would have been evident. When the crisis hit, 
the value of these assets, and therefore of bank capital, plummeted, causing a frantic 
global search for new capital.  
 The rise in leverage helped push the size of financial markets to unsustainable 
heights relative to the real economy. It made the financial system itself exceptionally 
fragile. This systemic fragility caused the decline in security prices brought on by the 
onset of crisis to trigger a de-leveraging process in which liquidity – the ability to sell a 
financial asset quickly with little if any capital loss - disappeared. “Liquidity is fragile, 
i.e, it can suddenly evaporate. Relatively small shocks, or instigators, can trigger liquidity 
spirals, causing liquidity to dry up suddenly and carrying the potential for a full-blown 
financial crisis” (Brunnermeier 2008, p. 21).Asset price declines led to margin calls, 
which led to forced assets sales and more margin calls in a dangerous downward spiral. 
“The leverage used to put [CDOs] together can amplify losses [in the downturn]. For 
example, a 4 percent loss in a mortgage backed security held by collateralized debt 
obligations can turn into almost a 40% loss to the holder of the CDO itself” (New York 
Times, “How reverse leverage in structured financial instruments works,” July 29 2007). 
The BIS’s Claudio Borrio explained that “The turmoil represented a sharp repricing of 
risk that, given the leverage built up in the system, led to, and was exacerbated by, an 
                                                 
63 Cioffi would later be charged by federal authorities with lying to investors about the precariousness of 
Bear Stearn’s financial situation.  
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evaporation of liquidity in many markets, including in the interbank markets” (Borrio 
2008, p. 9). New York Fed Chairman Timothy Geithner expressed concern about the 
destructive power of reverse leverage in May 2007:  
 Over the past 25 years or so, we have seen a significant number of episodes of 
financial shocks, in U.S. markets and globally. Although more different than 
similar in their nature and impact, they had some common features. They were 
unanticipated… And they typically involved the dynamic in which a sharp change 
in risk perception results in a fall in asset prices … As market participants move 
to protect themselves against further losses, by selling positions, requiring more 
margin, hedging against further declines, the shock is amplified and the brake 
becomes the accelerator (Geithner 2008a). 
 
 A serious develeraging process will freeze credit markets. Financial institutions 
will be less willing to take the additional risks associated with new loans, and interest 
rates on bonds will rise as forced sales lower bond prices. The rising cost of capital to 
shaky financial institutions means that whatever loans they are willing to make will have 
high interest rates attached.  Since the modern nonfinancial business and household 
sectors run on credit, the shrinking availability and rising cost of borrowing will 
eventually create a slowdown in economic growth. This is turn, will lead to lower profits 
and higher defaults on both business and household loans, which will aggravate the 
financial crisis and accelerate develeraging dynamics. The precise character of the crisis 
will depend on conditions in both sectors. The quarter century deregulation process along 
with the rapid pace of financial innovation and the moral hazard caused by past 
government bailouts created the conditions that spawned the recent financial boom that in 
turn created this potentially devastating crisis. Central banks and other regulatory bodies 
will be forced to take whatever interventions are required to stop the financial and 
possible economic collapse - no matter how high the cost. The dynamic of deregulation 
leading to financial booms that eventuate in crises that lead to bailouts and thus to yet 
larger booms rolls on.  
 The Fed tried to unlock frozen markets by extending massive loans to commercial 
banks, and, for the first time since the Great Depression, to investment banks as well. The 
Fed exchanged US Treasuries for shaky mortgage-related securities in such large 
quantities that the proportion of its assets invested in government bonds fell from 91% in 
August 2007 to 52% one year later (The Economist, “Mission creep at the Fed,” August 
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9, 2008). In addition, the Federal Home Loan Bank increased its loans to banks by almost 
$300 billion between June 2007 and June 2008, a rise of 43%. In the Bear Stearns rescue, 
the Fed in effect bought $29 billion worth of devalued securities from the failing 
investment bank. The near collapse of Fannie May and Freddie Mac, two Government 
Sponsored Enterprises that own or insure almost $5 trillion in mortgages (and made their 
top executives fabulously rich by investing in shaky mortgage-backed securities in the 
boom) led to a government promise to rescue them as well, including a commitment to 
buy their stock if necessary. In July 2008 the Congressional Budget Office estimated that 
this rescue could easily cost the taxpayer $25 billion, with a five percent chance of a loss 
of $100 billion. These desperate actions were motivated by a perceived need to stop the 
dangerous de-leveraging process from causing a systemic breakdown. It is quite likely 
that the cost of the bailouts will continue to rise and the form of bailouts will continue to 
break with precedent (in a process we might think of as induced regulatory innovation) as 
the crisis deepens.  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 The NFA was created in response to the financial market troubles of the late 
1970s and early 1980s. The emergence of this regime was made possible by the rise of 
right-wing governments and free market ideology in the US and UK in that period. 
Deregulation allowed financial assets to grow more rapidly than the real sector in the US 
starting in the early 1980s, a process accelerated by the stock market boom in the second 
half of the 1990s, the mortgage-housing boom that began in the late 1990s, and the rapid 
pace of financial innovation in the past decade. Following a recovery from the chaos of 
the 1980s, financial sector profits relative to GDP grew rapidly from the early 1990s 
through the end of the decade, then took off after 2002. From 1.5% in 1994, this ratio 
grew to 2% by 2000 and 3.7% by 2006 –at which point they constituted 40% of corporate 
profit.64  
 The NFA thus facilitated a tremendous increase in the size of financial markets 
and the profits of financial agents, but the structural flaws that made such growth possible 
                                                 
64 See Crotty 2007 for an explanation why financial profits were so high in an era believed to be one of 
ferocious competition. 
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also helped drive this process beyond safe boundaries, leading time and again to serious 
financial crises in both developed and developing countries. Reinhart and Rogoff 2008 
show that while there were very few banking crises in the Golden Age, the number of 
countries that experienced banking crisis exploded under the NFA. Alan Blinder, former 
vice chairman of the Federal Reserve said of the NFA: “It’s a failure at a lot of levels. It’s 
hard to find a piece of the system that actually worked well in the lead-up to the bust” 
(Blinder 2008). Horst Kohler, former head of the International Monetary Fund, recently 
compared bankers with alchemists, arguing that they are responsible for the “massive 
destruction of assets.”  
 The only good thing about this crisis is that it has made clear to any thinking, 
responsible person in the sector that international financial markets have 
developed into a monster that must be put back in its place. We need more severe 
and efficient regulation, higher capital requirements to underpin financial trades, 
more transparency and a global institution to independently oversee the stability 
of the international financial system. (Financial Times, “Köhler attacks markets 
‘monster,’” May 14 2008.)   
 
The NFA is so dangerous that it cannot reproduce itself over time without 
frequent government bailouts. But after every such ‘rescue,’ financial markets become 
larger, more complex, more opaque, and more highly leveraged. Thus, every rescue 
eventually leads to the need for yet larger and more aggressive future bailouts because the 
potential cost of nonintervention keeps rising along with the size and influence of 
financial markets. Meanwhile, the deleterious effects of this bloated and inefficient 
system - such as slower real sector growth, greater financial market volatility and rapidly 
rising economic and, therefore, political inequality - keep getting worse. As the recent 
crisis showed, this ratcheting secular process calls not only for larger state rescue 
operations, but more complex and creative interventions as well. The Financial Times 
chief capital markets editor Gillian Tett summarized the situation neatly: “Welcome to 
one of the most pernicious problems now haunting [financial] markets – namely the utter 
inadequacy of modern regulatory structures to cope with the shape of 21st-century 
finance” (Tett 2007). 
 Echoing Kohler’s call for a qualitative change in regulation to once again create 
effective social control over financial markets, Crotty and Epstein 2008 suggest a serious 
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program of regulatory reform designed to eliminate precisely those structural flaws that 
created the crisis. But thus far at least, regulators have proposed only mild palliatives 
clearly incapable of correcting the deep structural flaws in the NFA. Largely reflecting 
the interests of large financial institutions and the global rentier class, regulators have yet 
to demonstrate a willingness to meet the challenge posed by the new era of Finance 
Capital that has arisen under the auspices of the NFA. Radical regulatory reform adequate 
to its difficult task requires two substantial changes: 1) a qualitative change in the vector 
of political forces impinging on the ‘what should we do about reforming financial 
markets’ political debate that can help end the domination of the lords of finance on this 
issue; and 2) rejection of the theory of efficient capital markets that helped create and 
sustain the NFA, and reliance instead on the time-tested, realistic theory of financial 
markets developed by Keynes and extended by Minsky. We are not likely to achieve the 
first unless we achieve the second. 
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